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I. INTRODUCTION

There is widespread agreement across the political spectrum that the
greatest national security threat to the United States is that of terrorists
acquiring nuclear weapons.' In fact, since the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, presidential administrations2 from both major political
parties have warned of the grave danger of having hostile terrorists
obtain a nuclear bomb or other weapons of mass destruction [WMD].' It
was, after all, Usama bin Laden who declared that it was a "religious
duty" to acquire nuclear weapons and that he wished for a "Hiroshima"style 4 attack against the United States.5 In order to ensure that al-Qa'ida
does not detonate a nuclear device in the homeland or against an ally,
the United States must secure nuclear weapons, materials, and
technology around the globe 6 and Government leaders must confront a
* Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Counterterrorism Policy, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. B.A., Ohio State University; J.D., The University of Akron School of Law.
The author would like to thank Professor David S. Jonas for his valuable comments and
criticisms. The views and misjudgments contained herein belong entirely to the author.
1. 9/11 COMM'N REP.: FINAL REP. OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON

THE U.S. 380 (July 22, 2004) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT].

2. Presidential Debate Between President George W. Bush and Senator John F. Kerry,
Coral Gables, FL (Sept. 30, 2004) (President Bush arguing that the most serious threat facing
the country is weapons of mass destruction "in the hands of a terrorist enemy"); President
Barack Obama, Remarks at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009) ("we must
ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme
threat to global security.").
3. Regarding the different types of WMD-nuclear, chemical, biological, and
radiological-nuclear weapons are believed to be the most destructive. STEVE BOWMAN,
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE TERRORIST THREAT, Cong. Res. Serv. Report for Cong.,

RL31332, at 4 (Mar. 7, 2002).
4. A Hiroshima-style attack is an obvious reference to the U.S. use of an atomic bomb on
the city of Hiroshima, Japan on Aug. 6, 1945. On Aug. 9, 1945, the United States dropped a
second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan. The nuclear weapons used against Japan during World
War II have been estimated to cause over 100,000 deaths. Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral
Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield, 56 A.F. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2005) (citing U.S. STRATEGIC
BOMBING SURVEY: THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBS ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, Report from

the Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey 3 (June 30, 1946)).
5. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 380. See generally Rahimullah Yusufzai, Conversation
with Terror,TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 38; Steve Coll, What Bin Laden Sees in Hiroshima,WASH.
POST., Feb. 6, 2005, at Bl.

6. "Nuclear weapon surety" refers to design features, material, personnel, and procedures
that ensure a nuclear weapon is safe from unauthorized use. DEF. DEP'T, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
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leading source of this nuclear terrorism threat: Pakistan. As one scholar
noted: "When you map [weapons of mass destruction] and terrorism, all
roads intersect in Pakistan." 7
Recently it was discovered that nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer
(A.Q.) Khan created an illegal nuclear proliferation network based in
Pakistan and transferred sensitive technology and materials to rogue
nations.8 Additionally, it has been well reported that the al-Qa'ida
terrorist organization has been fostering relationships with Pakistani
nuclear scientists who sympathize with their extremist ideology in the
hopes of obtaining enough information and materials to start their own
nuclear weapons program.9 In addition to al-Qa'ida, Pakistan is home to
a large number of other extremist groups that have attempted to
overthrow (the often-unstable) government and obtain physical custody
of one of Islamabad's nuclear weapons.' 0
The combination of a nuclear arsenal, political instability, and
internal extremism makes Islamabad a prime target for those who are
unlawfully seeking nuclear weapons or materials. In order to defend its
own national security, the U.S. Government must be willing to help
ensure that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and materials are properly
safeguarded from terrorists' threats. There have been some press reports
indicating that since September 11, 2001, Washington has been
discreetly offering assistance in this realm; however, the extent of this
aid remains unclear and highly classified." It is the author's contention
that, as a matter of national security policy, the United States should
immediately and extensively (but not necessarily overtly) provide
nuclear weapon surety assistance to Pakistan.12
ASSISTANT TO THE SEC'Y OF DEF. FOR NUCLEAR MATTERS, NUCLEAR MATTERS: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 65 (2008) [hereinafter NUCLEAR MATTERS].

7. David E. Sanger, Obama's Worst PakistanNightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at
MM 32 (quoting Graham Allison).
8. See infra notes 72-74. For the purposes of this Article, "nuclear proliferation" refers to
the unlawful transfer of nuclear weapons, materials, or equipment to states, organizations
(including terrorist groups), or individuals.
9. See infra notes 67-71.
10. See infra notes 75-82.
11. See, e.g., Alex Wagner, U.S. Offers Nuclear Security Assistance to Pakistan, 31 ARMS
CONTROL TODAY 24 (2001); Bryan Bender, Pakistan, US in Talks on Nuclear Security, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 5, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/
2009/05/05/pakistan usintalks on nuclear security/; David E. Sanger & William J. Broad,
U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistanin GuardingNuclear Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/1 8nuke.html.
12. Sharad Joshi & Togzhan Kassenova, Issue Brief Cooperative Threat Reduction and
Pakistan, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (Aug. 4, 2008); SHARON SQUASSONI, GLOBALIZING
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION: A SURVEY OF OPTIONS, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. for Cong.,
RL32359 (Oct. 5, 2006) [hereinafter GLOBALIZING]; SHARON SQUASSONI, NUCLEAR THREAT
REDUCTION MEASURES FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. for Cong., RL31589
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Of course, such a policy must be implemented within the appropriate
legal boundaries. Although scholars have voiced concern that the
international legal framework governing nuclear non-proliferation
actually prohibits the United States from providing the Pakistanis with
nuclear-security assistance,' 3 this issue has previously not been the
subject of thorough academic scholarship. The Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT)14 is the cornerstone of nuclear nonproliferation law and governs many aspects of state-to-state nuclear
cooperation.' 5 Although the NPT does in fact prohibit some forms of
international nuclear assistance, the extent of this prohibition is not
explicitly defined by the treaty itself.16 Thus, the issue of whether
providing nuclear weapon surety aid to Islamabad would violate
Washington's obligations under the NPT is a matter of treaty
interpretation. This Article will analyze the NPT and determine what
legally permissible nuclear-security assistance Washington may provide
Islamabad.17 Part II of this Article discusses why and how Pakistan built
its nuclear arsenal as well as the national and international security
threats emanating from that arsenal. Part III briefly introduces the types
of security measures available to safeguard nuclear weapons and
materials from unlawful access or proliferation. Part IV thoroughly
examines the NPT by applying traditional methods of treaty
interpretation to determine how this body of law may impact U.S. aid to
Pakistan. Part V provides some concluding thoughts.

(Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION].
13. See Lisa A. Curtis, Keeping Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Out of the Hands of
Terrorists, Remarks before the U.S. House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Subcomms. on the
Middle East and South Asia, and Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade (June
27, 2007) (arguing that the United States "is prohibited both by legal and treaty obligations from
assisting the nuclear programs of states outside the nonproliferation regime"); Noah Shachtman,
Securing Pakistan's Nukes, WIRED (Nov. 30, 2007) ("The NPT therefore does not allow the
U.S. to assist Pakistan directly with controlling its nuclear weapons (though there is obviously
some room for interpretation), even though Pakistan itself never signed the treaty."); NUCLEAR
THREAT REDUCTION, supra note 12, at 15-17.
14. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 484,
729 U.N.T.S. 161, 169 [hereinafter NPT].
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Although not the focus of this Article, there are several domestic laws that may
restrict U.S. aid in this area to Pakistan. See NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION, supra note 12, at 17-

21.
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II. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

A. Why PakistanAcquired a Nuclear Weapon
Nuclear weapons scholar Joseph Cirincione argues that there are five
main reasons explaining why a state may seek nuclear weapons: (1)
security, (2) prestige, (3) domestic politics, (4) technology, and (5)
Cirincione's first category-national security-was
economics.
Pakistan's raison d'dtre for building a nuclear weapons program.' 9
More specifically, it was a series of geopolitical events that occurred in
the 1960s and 1970s across Asia that actually spurred Islamabad to
construct a nuclear weapon. First, in 1964, the People's Republic of
China tested a nuclear bomb and became only the fifth country in the
world to possess nuclear weapons. 20 China's elevation to a nucleararmed state caused then-Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
to conclude that India would create its own nuclear arsenal to compete
with China and, in response to its regional rival, Islamabad would need
to develop its own nuclear weapon. ' In 1965, Bhutto famously said,
"[i]f India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry,
but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice."2 2
Next, in 1971, India and Pakistan engaged in their third major armed
conflict since the partition of British India in 1947.23 Within only a few
weeks, India defeated the Pakistani Army, which ultimately enabled
East Pakistan to separate from the Pakistani state and form present-day
Bangladesh. 24 The manner in which the Pakistani Army was so rapidly
18. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
47 (2007).
19. JOHN CHIPMAN, NUCLEAR BLACK MARKETS: PAKISTAN, A.Q. KHAN AND THE RISE OF
PROLIFERATION NETWORKS 35 (2007).
20. GARY T. GARDNER, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: A PRIMER 41 (1994). The United
States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France were the other four nuclear powers at the time.

Id. at 37, tbl.4- 1.
21. CHIPMAN,supra note 19, at 19; Curtis, supra note 13, at 2.
22. GORDON CORERA, SHOPPING FOR BOMBS: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, GLOBAL
INSECURITY, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE A.Q. KHAN NETWORK 9 (2006).
23. The 1947 partition created East and West Pakistan, which were two noncontiguous
territories separated by India. U.S. Department of State, The South Asia Crisis and the Founding
of Bangladesh, 1971 (Office of the Historian), available at http://history.state.gov/milestones/
1969-1976/SouthAsia (last visited Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter South Asia Crisis]. Although
Islam was the predominant religion among East and West Pakistan citizens, each territory had
its own unique language, ethnicity, and culture. Id. Corera notes, "[t]he residents of East
Pakistan were resentful because they were treated as second class citizens and locked out of the
best jobs in the army and civil service by West Pakistanis .. .. " CORERA, supra note 22, at 9.
24. South Asia Crisis, supra note 23. In 1970, East Pakistanis overwhelmingly voted in
their parliamentary elections for political candidates who advocated for East Pakistani
autonomy. Id. However, after the elections, the existing Pakistani Government jailed the
electoral winners, which resulted in "mass protests" in East Pakistan that "were brutally
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demolished 25 caused some to think that Pakistan's "very survival
seemed to be at question." 26 The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War significantly
impacted Pakistan's foreign policy in that it caused Islamabad to
believe: (1) that India was determined to destroy Pakistan, (2) that in
times of war, allies (including the United States) could not be relied
upon to provide military support, and, (3) above all, nuclear arms were
necessary to guarantee state survival. Thus, it was the humiliating
defeat in the Indo-Pakistan War in 1971 that "strengthened [thenPresident] Bhutto's conviction" to launch a nuclear weapons program
for Pakistan. 28
Finally, in 1974, India conducted a "peaceful nuclear explosion" and
became the sixth state to have nuclear weapon capability. This event
actually motivated the Pakistani Government to move more urgently in
developing its own nuclear bomb.3 o In what can be understood as a
response to India's nuclear test in 1974, then-Prime Minister Bhutto
appointed A.Q. Khan to oversee Pakistan's secret nuclear prog ram and
to more quickly facilitate the development of a nuclear weapon.
These three events, which occurred in a relatively short ten-year
timeframe, illustrate that realpolitiksecurity concerns were the principal
drivers behind Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.32 According to
nonproliferation analysts Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, "[d]eterring
India's nuclear weapons and augmenting Pakistan's inferior
conventional forces are widely believed to be the primary missions for
suppressed by the Pakistani army. . . ." Id. Because India supported the East Pakistani guerilla
forces, "West Pakistan responded with air attacks on India," which resulted in "open war
between the two powers ..... Id. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War was "brief' in that it only lasted
approximately two weeks and, in the end, Pakistan was "forced to accede to the establishment of
an independent Bangladesh in place of East Pakistan." Id.
25.

See J.N. DIXIT, INDIA-PAKISTAN INWAR AND PEACE 205 (2002) ("The Pakistani forces

in East Pakistan were decisively defeated, with India taking 93,000 prisoners of war, the largest
number of soldiers taken prisoner in world history. . .
26. CORERA, supra note 22, at 3.

27. Id. at 9.
28. DIxIT, supra note 25,

at 325.

See also CORERA,

Weapons of Mass Destruction:
GlobalSecurity.Org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmdI/world/pakistan/nuke.htm

supra note 22, at 8-11;

Pakistan Nuclear Weapons,
(last visited Jan. 24, 2011)

[hereinafter GlobalSecurity]; PAUL K. KERR & MARY BETH NIKITIN, PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY ISSUES, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. for Cong., RL34248, at

2 (Feb. 23, 2010).
29. GARDNER, supra note 20, at 42.

30. CORERA, supra note 22, at 14. See also GlobalSecurity, supra note 28; KERR &
NIKITIN, supra note 28, at 2.
31. CORERA, supra note 22, at 17-18. See also GlobalSecurity, supra note 28; Curtis,
supranote 13.
32. See Curtis,supra note 13 ("Pakistan's regional security concerns have led it to acquire
nuclear weapons in theface ofpersistentand often severe internationalpenalties.").
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Islamabad's nuclear arsenal." 33 Similarly, the Nuclear Threat Initiative
assessed, "Islamabad regards nuclear weapons as essential to safeguard
the South Asian balance of power and offset its conventional inferiority
and lack of strategic depth against India." 34 Until Pakistan's perceived
regional security issues are resolved, it is unlikely that Pakistan will
dismantle its current nuclear arsenal or weapons program.
B. How PakistanAcquired a Nuclear Weapon
Although Pakistan's "peaceful" nuclear energy program dates back
to the 1950s,3 5 shortly after the 1971 India-Pakistan War, President
Bhutto conducted several diplomatic visits across the Middle East
seeking funding to establish a nuclear weapons program. 36 The rise of
post-colonial nationalism in the region and a continuing Arab-Israeli
conflict caused several Arab states to sympathize with Bhutto's idea for
the predominantly-Muslim Pakistan to possess its own nuclear
weapon.37 In addition to the relationships he developed with his Arab
counterparts, Bhutto also fostered close ties with China, which became
a "crucial ally" and "silent partner in Pakistan's [nuclear] program." 38
During this same timeframe, A.Q. Khan was exploiting his role as a
metallurgical engineer at a European uranium enrichment company,
URENCO,3 9 and sending stolen blueprints, sensitive designs, and even
discarded centrifuge parts back to Pakistan.4 0
33.

KERR &NIIGTIN, supra note 28, at 2.

34. NTI, Country Overviews: Pakistan, http://www.nti.org/eresearch/profiles/pakistan/
index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
35. CORERA, supra note 22, at 8. Pakistan established its Atomic Energy Commission in
the 1950s after "an American 'Atoms for Peace' exhibition toured the country, touting the
wonders of nuclear power." Id. Under President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program, the
United States provided nuclear material to foreign governments and assisted them in the
"peaceful application of nuclear technologies." DEP'T OF ENERGY, NOTICE OF INTENT TO
PREPARE AN ENVTL IMPACT STATEMENT ON A PROPOSED POL'Y FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF U.S.

58 Fed. Reg. 54,336, 54,338 (Oct.
1993). Such assistance, however, would only be provided if the foreign counterpart "agreed to
forgo the development of nuclear weapons." Id. See generally President Dwight Eisenhower,
Address to the U.N. General Assembly: United States "Atoms for Peace" Proposal (Dec. 8,
1953).
36. CORERA, supra note 22, at 11.
37. Id. at 11-13. Libyan leader Colonel Gadaffi described nuclear weapons as "the sword
of Islam." Id. at 11.
38. Id. at 13. Bhutto believed that Beijing wanted to use Pakistan to counter the rise of
India, with whom China fought a war with in 1962. Id. China provided Pakistan with "crucial
technical help" in the development of a nuclear bomb. Id. See also GlobalSecurity, supra note
28.
39. CORERA, supra note 22, at 5-7 (describing Khan's employment relationship with
URENCO).
40. Id. at 14-16. According to a URENCO official, Khan "stole the designs for almost
ORIGIN FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL,
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Bhutto initially focused on using plutonium 4 1 as an energy source for
building a nuclear weapon and, in 1974, Pakistan signed a contract with
the French government to purchase the designs for a reprocessing
facility to use for its existing nuclear power plants. 42 However, after
significant public pressure, especially from the United States, the
French abolished their agreement with Pakistan after learning that
Islamabad had a secret nuclear weapons program. 43 Additionally, after
India's 1974 nuclear test, several countries formed the "London Club,"
which established guidelines to safeguard the exportation of nuclearrelated materials and (as was its purpose) complicated Pakistan's
nuclear procurement initiatives.4 It was at this juncture that Khan, who
was promoted to oversee Pakistan's Engineering Research Laboratories
(ERL), convinced the government to focus on uranium enrichment
technology as the primary source for its nuclear weapons program.4 5 By
using the uranium enrichment method, Pakistan was able to more easily
keep its weapons program clandestine because such a process did not
require a large and visible reprocessing facility and, instead, could be
assembled "piecemeal."
In order to implement his plan, Khan drew upon his experiences
from URENCO and established a nuclear procurement network
involving governments and private companies across Europe, 47 the
every centrifuge on the drawing board." Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 20; GlobalSecurity, supra note 28. There are two distinct methods for building
nuclear weapons: (1) the gun assembly technique and (2) the implosion technique. CIRINCIONE,
supra note 18, at 10. The former is the "least complex" and uses uranium as a fissile material.
Id. at 10-11. The latter involves using plutonium and, although it is a more complex design, it
"allows for a smaller device." Id. at 11. "Plutonium can be obtained from fuel that has been
reprocessed from nuclear power plants." GlobalSecurity, supra note 28.
42. CoRERA, supra note 22, at 20; GlobalSecurity, supra note 28.
43. CoRERA, supra note 22, at 20-21. By the 1970s, the CIA was learning about
Pakistan's covert nuclear weapons program and President Carter appointed Joseph Nye to be the
lead diplomat on nuclear proliferation issues. Id. at 19-22. After Ambassador Nye failed to get
concessions from the Pakistani government to halt their nuclear ambitions, he disclosed to
French officials "human intelligence" and "highly classified satellite imagery" of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program. Id. at 20-21.
44. CORERA, supra note 22, at 20-21. The London Club was renamed the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). Id. at 20. See also NSG, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org (last
visited on Jan. 24, 2011).
45. CoRERA, supra note 22, at 20-22; GlobalSecurity, supra note 28. The ERL reported its
developments directly to the Prime Minister instead of the Pakistani Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC), which, until that point, had primary responsibility for Pakistan's nuclear
program. CoRERA, supra note 22, at 17; CHIPMAN, supra note 19, at 17-18. The ERL was later
renamed "The Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories." GlobalSecurity, supra note 28.
46. CORERA, supra note 22, at 21. GlobalSecurity, supra note 28.
47. According to Corera, "[a]lmost all of the equipment in Kahuta-the equipment that
would be used to make the weapons material for Pakistan's bombs-came from Europe."
CORERA, supra note 22, at 22.
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Middle East, and Africa.4 8 Khan sought to purchase the necessary
equipment and technology from suppliers and middle-men located
throughout the world to avoid detection from both Western intelligence
agencies and the nuclear non-proliferation regime.4 9 Although members
of the London Group were continually expanding their export-control
list, which made it more difficult for countries to attain nuclear weapon
technology and materials, Khan resolved this dilemma by simply
procuring the underlying rudimentary parts and assemblin§ the final
product himself or manufacturing what he needed in-country. Within a
few years of his appointment at the ERL, Khan was able to bring
together the necessary equipment and materials to begin enriching
uranium."
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, despite international nuclear
safeguards and diplomatic pressure to halt Pakistan's nuclear weapons
program, "much of the damage had already been done and many of the
key parts were in place." 52 Despite internal upheaval, bloody coups, 53
and a devastating armed conflict waging in neighboring Afghanistan, 54
Khan and his core team of scientists remained in place building
Pakistan's first nuclear weapon.5 5 According to Khan, Pakistani
scientists completed uranium enrichment in 1982, and, after Islamabad
received an actual nuclear warhead blueprint from China, they
conducted a cold-test56 two years later.5 Although the exact date of
48. Id. at 22-25. In developing Pakistan's secret nuclear weapons program, Khan also
relied on the relationships Bhutto fostered during his secret diplomatic trips. See infra notes 5254. For example, Pakistan used Colonel Gadaffi-whom Bhutto named a Pakistani cricket
stadium after-to procure Yellow Cake from Niger. CORERA, supra note 22, at 12, 24.
49. Id. at 22-25. Corera describes how Pakistan sent teams around the world, each
employing different procurement methods (including relying on diplomatic immunity and
official government transportation), to smuggle sensitive items and information back to
Pakistan. Id. at 22-23. Corera also described how, in some cases, the Pakistani nuclear
procurement teams were quite brazen and open about their activities. Id. at 22-26, 33-35.
50. Id. at 22-27, 41. See also GlobalSecurity,supra note 28.
51. CORERA, supra note 22, at 42-45.
52. Id. at 27.
53. Id. at 27-28. After contested Pakistani elections in 1977, there was "domestic unrest,
marital law, and finally a coup." Id. at 27. Pakistan's new leader, General Zia ul-Haq oversaw
Bhutto's death by hanging. Id. at 28.
54. After the U.S.S.R invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became a primary base for
anti-Soviet insurgent operations. Id. at 30. See GlobalSecurity,supra note 28.
55. Corera notes that "[b]y the 1980s Khan was safely embedded within the Pakistan
program and was protected by his indispensable function for his government in building the
bomb ..... CORERA, supra note 22, at 40.
56. A cold test "involves triggering the implosion device to check if it works[,] but
without using fissile material." Id. at 44.
57. Id. at 44. Corera describes how the PAEC disputes Khan's contributions to Pakistan's
bomb and claims to have completed its own cold test in 1983. Id. See also GlobalSecurity,supra
note 28; CHPMAN, supra note 19, at 15-23 (describing both PAEC and ERL's role in developing
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completion is unclear, by the end of the 1980s, Pakistan had nuclear
weapon capability,5 8 and, during another confrontation with India in
1990,59 it assembled an actual nuclear bomb. 60 Finally, in May 1998,
Pakistan publically conducted two nuclear weapons tests and erased all
doubt over its nuclear weapon status.6 1
Experts on the subject have estimated that Pakistan currently has
between 60 and 130 nuclear weapons.62 Islamabad's nuclear strategic
doctrine is guided by the principle of minimum credible deterrence. 63
The four policy objectives underlying Pakistan's nuclear weapons
program are: (1) deter external aggression, (2) deter through both
conventional and strategic forces, (3) deter counterattack strategies by
securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear weapon reprisal, and
(4) stabilize strategic deterrence in the region. 64 It has been reported that
Pakistan's "nuclear posture is designed to preserve territorial integrity
against Indian attack, prevent military escalation, and counter its main
rival's conventional superiority." 65 In 2005, Islamabad stated that it had
reached the minimal deterrent threshold. 66
C. The Threats EmanatingFrom Pakistan'sNuclear Weapons Program
When the Pakistani government tested its first nuclear weapon in
1998, it became a primary source for terrorists seeking to acquire
nuclear bombs, materials, and technology. In fact, some elements within
the Pakistani government sympathize with al-Qa'ida's extremist
ideology, which, consequently, increases the probability that a rogue
Pakistani official would share highly sensitive nuclear information with
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program). Corera argues that Pakistan likely had "two parallel
weaponization programs, [based in the PAEC and ERLI, to introduce an element of
competition." CORERA, supra note 22, at 44.
58. CORERA, supra note 22, at 49. See also GlobalSecurity,supra note 28.
59. This crisis was over Kashmir. CORERA, supra note 22, at 53 (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 53. In accordance with domestic law, President George H.W. Bush was forced
to cut-off aid to Pakistan in Oct. 1990 once he could no longer certify that Pakistan did not have
a nuclear weapon. Id. at 55. See also GlobalSecurity, supra note 28.
61. GlobalSecurity, supra note 28 ("[o]n 28 May and 30 May 1998 Pakistan conducted at
least two nuclear weapons tests. These tests came slightly more than 2 weeks after India carried
out 5 nuclear tests of its own, and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would
respond to India. . ."). See also CHIPMAN, supra note 19, at 23.
62. CHIPMAN, supra note 19, at 31 (illustrating various estimates of Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal).
63. Id. at 33-38. See also KERR & NIKrrIN, supra note 28, at 7-8.
64. KERR & NIKITIN, supra note 28, at 8. See CHIPMAN, supra note 19, at 33-38. "The
Pakistani government has consistently said that it rejects the logic of parity, and that its goal is
simply to attain the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on India." Id. at 33.
65. KERR & NIKiTtN, supra note 28, at 8.
66. CHIPMAN, supra note 19, at 33 (citation omitted).
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the terrorist organization. It is well-documented that high-ranking alQa'ida members have been in contact with Pakistani nuclear scientists
in order to obtain information that would enable it to establish its own
nuclear weapons program. 68 For example, in August 2001, it was
reported that senior-level Pakistani nuclear scientists met with Usama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, Afghanistan.69 For
approximately three days, the Pakistani scientists answered questions
related to nuclear devices and other weapons of mass destruction.o It
was noted that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri left the meeting in Kabul with
"detailed information on the construction of nuclear weapons." 7 1 More
recently, it was uncovered that Khan converted his nuclear procurement
network to a proliferation network and sold nuclear weapon material
and technology across the globe.72 Iran, Libya, and North Koreacurrent and former designated state sponsors of terrorism7 3 are known
to have used Khan's network to receive nuclear assistance. 74
In addition to the threat of Pakistani scientists disclosing nuclear
secrets to al-Qa'ida or other terrorist organizations and states, U.S.
policymakers need to be concerned with having extremists inside
Pakistan gaining physical control of a nuclear weapon or material.
Pakistan is a safe-haven to several extremist groups, including al-Qa'ida
and the Taliban, that pose a direct threat to Islamabad, as well as to the
United States and its allies.7 6 In January 2007, then-Director of National
Intelligence John Negroponte spoke bluntly on the subject: "Pakistan is
a frontline partner in the war on terror. Nevertheless, it remains a major
67. See generally Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Nuclear Security in Pakistan:Reducing the Risks
ofNuclear Terrorism, 39 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 6 (2009).

68. See Jack Kelley, Terrorists CourtedNuclear Scientists, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2001,
at 1A; CIRINCIONE, supra note 18, at 92-94.

69. CIRINCIONE, supra note 18, at 94. Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood (a founding father
of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program) and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed (a former technical
director at one of Pakistan's nuclear weapons design facilities), were among the Pakistani
scientists who attended the meeting in Kabul. Id.; Kelley, supra note 68.
70. CIRINCIONE, supra note 18, at 94

71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. See CORERA, supra note 22, at 56.

73. U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, State Sponsors of
Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/cl4151.htm (last visited on Jan. 24, 2011). Of the three
countries listed, only Iran remains a Department of State designated State Sponsor of Terrorism.
Id.
74. CORERA, supra note 22.

75. Better Atom Security Needed in Pakistan-ElBaradei,REUTERS, Jan 10, 2008. Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, stated "I fear
that .. . an extremist regime could take root in [Pakistan] which has 30 to 40 warheads." Id.
76. K. ALAN KRONSTADT, PAKISTAN AND TERRORISM: A SuMMARY, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep.
for Cong., RS22632, at 2 (Mar. 27, 2007). See also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, PAKISTAN:
THE MILITANT JIHADI CHALLENGE, ASIA REPORT No. 164 (2009).
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source of Islamic extremism and the home for some top terrorist
leaders." 77 Extremists continually attempt to assassinate Pakistani
political leaders and cause turmoil across the country. 8 Further, the
Pakistani government itself is plagued with its own instability as
evidenced by a history of coups and political corruption. 79 This
environment underscores the legitimate concerns of whether antiAmerican terrorists could actually capture nuclear weapons if the
Pakistani government collapses due to assassination,8 0 large scale
terrorist attack, or unanticipated coup d'6tat.8 ' General David Petraeus,
former Commander of U.S. Central Command, testified to Congress
regarding this very issue and noted that a downfall in the Pakistani
government "would provide transnational terrorist groups and other
extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a
safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks." 82 This sentiment
was reinforced by a senior-level al-Qa'ida leader who recently said,
"God willing, [Pakistan's] nuclear weapons will not fall into the hands
of the Americans and the mujahideen would take them and use them
against the Americans." 83
III. NUCLEAR SURETY

Incorporating the most advanced nuclear surety measures into
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal will greatly reduce proliferation and nuclear
terrorism threats. The concept of nuclear surety can be divided into four
broad categories: weapon security, material protection, facility security,

77. KRONSTADT, supra note 76, at 2.

78. Pakistani Leader Escapes Attempt at Assassination, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2003),
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9807E6DD173EF935A15751CIA
9659C8B63; Bhutto Assassination Ignites Disarray,N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2007), availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/28/world/asia/28pakistan.html; Pakistan Politician Escapes
Life Attempt, BBC NEWS (Feb. 9, 2010), availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8505410.stm.
79.

See generally INT'L CRISIS GROUP, PAKISTAN: TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY?, ASIA

REP. No. 40 (2002) (discussing Pakistan's history of government coups); DIXrr, supra note 25,
at 239-306 (overview of Pakistan's seven different governments between 1972-1999).
80. See Karin Brulliard, Pakistan Assassinations Highlight Sway of Radical Clerics,
WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2011) (discussing the recent assassination of two senior level Pakistani
officials-Shahbaz Bhatti, Pakistan's federal minorities minister, and Salman Taseer, governor
of Punjab province-and the threat of future violence.).
81.

CIRINCIONE, supra note 18, at 94.

82. On the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Review and the Posture of the U.S. Central
Command: Hearing Before S. Armed Services Comm. (2009) (statement of General David H.
Petraeus, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command).
83. Al Qaeda Says Would Use Pakistani Nuclear Weapons, REUTERS (June 22, 2009)
(quoting Mustafa Abu al-Yazid) (emphasis added).
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and personnel reliability. 84 Related to nuclear weapons security are
"command and control" procedures and "use control" technology. The
former refers to the organization and communication processes that
provide the means for the proper authority to employ a nuclear weapon;
the latter consists of weapon design features that permit only authorized
use of nuclear weapons.8 6 The control-and-command procedures and
use control technology, "establish the framework through which
absolute control of nuclear weapons is maintained at all times."" The
United States employs several different types of use control
mechanisms,8 8 which may, if permitted to be shared, significantly
improve Pakistan's nuclear weapon security.
Regarding nuclear material, there are generally three categories of
security measures: (1) material protection, (2) control, and (3)
accounting (MPCA). 9 Because nuclear materials are used at different
stages of weapons develo ment, a MPCA system needs to be flexible to
"follow material flows." International nuclear safeguard-verification
bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), "rely
heavily" on independent state systems of accounting and control in
keeping track of nuclear materials. 92 The Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) is a legally binding agreement
that provides guidance on the level of protection certain defined types of
nuclear material should receive.93 Additionally, since the CPPNM's
84. See NUCLEAR MATTERS, supra note 6; GLOBALIZING, supra note 12, at 16-19;
NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION, supra note 12, at 8-11,
85. NUCLEAR MATTERS, supranote 6, at 76.

86. Id. at 76-77.
87. Id. at 77.
88. Id. at 77-78. For example, in strategic nuclear weapons, the United States employs a
"system coded control" that requires an "externally-transmitted authorization code" in order to
employ the missiles. Id. at 78. The Command Disablement System (CDS) permits an individual
to manually activate the "non-violent disablement of essential weapons components, which
renders the warhead inoperable." Id. The Active Protection System (APS) is a feature that
"senses attempts to gain unauthorized access to weapon-critical components" and responds with
the automatic destruction of critical weapon components. Id. A Permissive Action Link (PAL)
"is a device included in or attached to a nuclear weapon system in order to preclude arming
and/or launching until the insertion of a prescribed, discrete code or combination." Id.
89.

SHAUN GREGORY, PAKISTAN SECURITY RESEARCH UNIT BRIEF No. 22, THE SECURITY

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PAKISTAN, at 3 (2007). The extent of Pakistan's enabling code

technology remains uncertain. Id at 4
90. NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION, supra note 12, at 23.

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124 [hereinafter CPPNM]. The CPPNM provides, inter alia,
guidelines on the "[I]evels of physical protection for nuclear material during storage incidental
to international nuclear transport" and the "[1]evels of physical protection for nuclear material
during international transport." Id. at Annex I.
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enactment, the IAEA produced Information Circular (INFCIRC)/225/
Rev.4, which provides updated nuclear material security standards. 4
Creating a more secure nuclear facility can help ensure that
unauthorized users do not gain access inside a nuclear facility and
protect against employees from unlawfully removing sensitive nuclear
technology and materials. 95 According to National Defense Specialist
Sharon Squassoni, "[p]erimeter security measures, such as gates and
other barriers like barbed wire and personnel identification systems, can
help minimize the threat of unauthorized entry. Sensors to detect
unauthorized actions (movement, tampering) can help against both
insider and outsider threats., 9 6 Upgrading facilities to include devices to
monitor sensitive areas and establishing "accounting and access
procedures" can also contribute to nuclear security. 97 In addition to
material security, the CPPNM and INFIRCIR/225/Rev.4 also describe
appropriate levels of nuclear weapon facility security. 9 8
Lastly, it is essential to nuclear weapons security that the personnel
assigned to sensitive areas are themselves trustworthy.99 A Personnel
Reliability Program (PRP), which is essentially an employee-character
screening process, should be a part of any nuclear weapons safety
program to "ensure that personnel are reliable and possess the necessary
judgment to work with nuclear weapons." 00 A PRP should be thorough
in conducting its nuclear employee screening process and consist of a
periodic review to ensure that employees continually meet the reliability
standards.' 0 ' Additionally, a nuclear weapons program should consist of
the "Two-Person Rule," which mandates that at least two employees
(with the appropriate level of security clearance) be present when a
nuclear weapon is being accessed.102
Over the years, Pakistani officials have attempted to alleviate
concerns regarding the security (or lack thereof) of its nuclear weapons.
For example, a month after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United
94. Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC/225/Rev.4
[hereinafter PPNMNF]. The INFCIRC notes that its recommended nuclear security measures
"are based on the state of the art in physical protection hardware and systems and on the types of
nuclear material and nuclear facilities." Id. at § 1.1.
95.

NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION, supra note 12, at 23.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Supra notes 93-94.
99. NUCLEAR MATTERS, supra note 6, at 74; NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION, supra note 12,
at 23.
100. NUCLEAR MATTERS, supra note 6, at 74.

101. Id. at 74-75. A U.S government PRP may consist of: (a) a security investigation; (b) a
physical and mental health evaluation; (c) a personnel file review; (d) an oral interview; and, (e)
a proficiency qualification examination. Id.
102. Id. at 75.
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States, Pakistani officials declared that "our [nuclear] assets are 100
percent secure"l 03 and "all our nuclear assets, all our strategic assets are
in very, very safe hands."' 04 More recently, Pakistani President Asif Ali
Zardari indicated that he is "totally confident" in his country's nuclear
security structure.s0 5 Additionally, Islamabad has attempted to
incorporate, at least to some degree, American nuclear weapon surety
measures into its own nuclear arsenal. 106 However, these public
assurances and recent security upgrades do not instill confidence in
Pakistan's nuclear weapon security system. Rather, the extraordinary
level of secrecy surrounding Islamabad's nuclear program does not
allow for any independent weapon security verification. As Admiral
Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, "we're
limited in what we actually know" about Pakistan's nuclear weapons
program.o0 Although IAEA has verification access to four of Pakistan's
nuclear facilities, several other Pakistani nuclear weapons-related
facilities are not under IAEA safeguards.1o For instance, the Khan
Research Laboratory, which Pakistan uses to create weapons-grade
uranium, and New Laboratories, a plutonium processing plant, are not
subject to IAEA safeguards.109 There are additional nuclear enrichment
facilities located across the country, the existence of which Islamabad
refuses to publically acknowledge.110 The discovery of Khan's global
nuclear proliferation black market, which flourished even after Pakistan
upgraded its nuclear security measures, has renewed concerns over
Islamabad's nuclear surety.
Therefore, it is essential that the U.S government work with Pakistan
to ensure, beyond any doubt, that its nuclear weapons and materials are
secure. Although it would be a daunting endeavor, if Washington
convinces Islamabad to accept such aid, there are obvious combinations
103. David Albright, SecuringPakistan'sNuclear Weapons Complex (Paper commissioned
and sponsored by the Stanley Foundation for the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference, Strategies
for Regional Security), Oct. 2001 (citing PakistaniNuclear Assets Are Safe: Spokesman Says,
KYODO NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 2, 2001).

104. President Musharraf, Interview on Larry King Live, CNN, Oct. 22, 2001, availableat
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/22/1kl.00.html.
105. President Asif Ali Zardari, Interview on Larry King Live, CNN, Dec. 2, 2008,
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/02/larry.king.zardari.transcript/
index.html.
106. See GREGORY, supra note 89, at 3; CHIPMAN, supra note 19, at 107-18; Kenneth N.
Luongo & Naeem Salik, Building Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security, 37 ARMs
CONTROL TODAY 11 (2007).
107. KERR & NIKITIN, supra note 28, at 2. Kerr and Nikitin note that "Leon Panetta,
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, similarly acknowledged . . . that the United States
does not possess the intelligence to locate all of Pakistan's nuclear weapons-related sites." Id.
108. NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION, supra note 12, at 9.

109. Id.
110. KERR & NIKITIN, supra note 28, at 2-6.
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of assistance it can provide in this area."' For example, the current
administration may want to collaborate with Pakistani officials in
constructing nuclear facility upgrades or provide nuclear weapon
security technology, such as Comman Disablement Systems (CDS),
Active Protection Systems (APS), and Pennissive Action Links
(PALs).11 2 Washington could focus on aiding Islamabad by sharing its
own nuclear weapon surety "best practices" or creating employment
positions for Pakistani nuclear scientists to prevent them from seeking
other, more nefarious, forms of employment. The United States may
wish to provide Pakistan with funding so it could purchase its own
nuclear weapon tracking and surveillance equipment. The next logical
step is to turn to the NPT in order to determine whether any, or all, of
these nuclear weapon security assistance measures are prohibited by
international law.

IV.

NPT AND TREATY INTERPRETATION

The NPT was established to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and technology, promote international cooperation in the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and facilitate nuclear weapon
disarmament.11 3 Since it opened for signature in 1968, 187 countries
have ratified the NPT. 114 No other international agreement "is more
symbolic of nonproliferation or has done more to institutionalize the
norm of nonProliferation in foreign ministries and legislatures around
the world."1 ' The United States ratified the NPT in 1969; Pakistan has
not yet signed the NPT.116
The NPT is considered "discriminatory" in that it distinguishes
between-and creates different obligations among-"Nuclear Weapon
States" (NWS) and "Non-Nuclear Weapon States" (NNWS)." 7 The
111. See, e.g., Joshi & Kassenova, supra note 12.
112. See NUCLEAR MATTERS, supra note 6 (describing this technology in greater detail).
113. NPT, supra note 14; NPT, Brief Background, http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/
treaty/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter NPT Background].
114. Id. "More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and
disarmament Agreement." NPT Background, supra note 113. The NPT entered into force in
1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995. Final Document on Extension of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 11, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 959, Annex, Decision 3, at
972-73 (1995).
115. GARDNER, supra note 20, at 54.
116. NPT, supra note 14.
117. Id. The fact that countries adhere to different obligations under the NPT has been
described as the "Grand Bargain" of the NPT. See David S. Jonas, Variationson Non-Nuclear:
May the "FinalFour" Join the Nuclear NonproliferationTreaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States
While Retaining Their Nuclear Weapons?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 417, 426 (2005). "The
'Grand Bargain' of the NPT is that the NWS will work towards nuclear disarmament while
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treaty defines NWS as those that have "manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1,
1967.""' The NPT does not define NNWS.ll 9 The United States
detonated a nuclear device prior to 1967 and is considered a NWS.1 20
Despite the fact that Pakistan possesses a nuclear arsenal, it is
considered a NNWS under the NPT because it did not manufacture or
explode its first nuclear weapon until after the 1967 cut-off date.12 1 As
Professor David Jonas notes "[b]y failing to define [NNWS], the
drafters of the Treaty-wittingly or unwittingly-granted significant
leeway in application in a critical area . .

.

. There is no prohibition [in

the NPT] of NNWS possessing nuclear weapons."l122
Article I of the NPT outlines restrictions on a NWS "Party to the
Treaty" and Article II focuses on the behavior of a NNWS "Party to the
Treaty." Thus, because Article II prohibitions are limited to a "Party to
the Treaty," they are not legally binding on Pakistan, which has not
ratified the NPT.123 However, because Article I explicitly addresses
NWS, its binding language will ultimately be the determining factor of
whether Washington can provide Islamabad with nuclear security
assistance.124 Article I provides:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to
sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the NNWS, who in turn commit
to forgo seeking nuclear weapons and to place their nuclear facilities under international
safeguards." Id.
118. NPT, supra note 14, art. IX(3).
119. Id. The term NNWS is commonly understood to refer to a state that does not possess
nuclear weapons or a state with nuclear weapons that is not a party to the NPT.
120. Id. Russia, United Kingdom, China, and France are the only other countries
considered NWS under the NPT. Id. See supra note 20.
121. NPT, supra note 14, at art. IX(3). This point is crystallized by the fact that the NPT
distinguishes between a "[NNWS] Party to the Treaty" and simply a "NNWS." Compare id art.
I, with id. art. II. Under this framework, Pakistan would be considered the latter because it has
not signed the NPT and thus is not a "Party" to the treaty. For further discussion, see generally,
Jack I. Garvey, To Fix the Nuclear Non-ProliferationRegime-Avoid State Classification, 21
FLA. J. INT'L L. 371 (2009).

122. Jonas, supra note 117, at 442-43.
123. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, art. 34 ("[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a
third State without its consent.") [hereinafter VCLT].
124. Without actually analyzing whether the NPT is a self-executing or non-self-executing
treaty, it is assumed for this Article that the NPT creates legally binding restriction on the
United States.
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manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.' 2 5
Article I, by its very terms, has two concrete restrictions on NWS
behavior. First, a NWS is prohibited from "transfer[ing] to any recipient
whatsoever" nuclear weapons or devices or "control over such weapons
or [] devices."' 26 Second, a NWS is not permitted to "assist, encourage,
or induce any [NNWS]" to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or
"control over such weapons or explosive devices."' 2 7 For purposes of
this Article, it is assumed that because the nuclear security assistance
mechanismsl28 are not in-and-of themselves weaponry or composed
from any nuclear material or technology, they are not "nuclear
weapons" or "nuclear explosive devices" per the NPT.1 29 Thus, germane
to this analysis is whether aiding Islamabad with nuclear surety
measures is equivalent to (1) transferring control over nuclear weapons
or devices, or (2) assisting, encouraging, or inducing Pakistan to
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or control over such weapons
or devices.
Although Article I substantially addresses proliferation and state-tostate cooperation, it fails to define some key terms. 130 By not explicitly
defining "control," "assist," "encourage," "induce," or "manufacture"
the NPT does not clearly articulate restrictions on NWS behavior.
Therefore, one must apply traditional methods of treaty interpretation in
order to determine what forms of international cooperation are actually
permitted under the NPT.131 Domestically, the courts rely upon several
techniques of treaty interpretation, some of which coincide with the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT],' 3 2 as well as others
125. NPT, supra note 14, art. I.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra Part Ill.
129. It should be noted that nuclear security assistance measures described herein are also
not the equivalent to "special fissionable material" or "equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material" and
thus do not violate Article III of the NPT. See NPT, supra note 14, art. Ill.
130. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 116-22.
131.

MASON WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS

CONTROL 67 (1969) ("Since none of these terms [are] explicitly defined, the scope of the [NPT]
will depend largely on how each is interpreted.").
132. See Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 2000)
(providing examples of domestic courts viewing the VCLT "as an authoritative codification of
customary international law.") (citations omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 cmt. a (1987) ("[The VCLT] represents generally

accepted principles and the United States has also appeared willing to accept them despite
differences of nuance and emphasis.").
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that have more locally-oriented factors. These treaty construction
methods include, inter alia, analyzing: (1) the terms' ordinary meaning,
(2) travaux prdparatoires, (3) domestic ratification history, (4)
subsequent state practice, (5) other relevant international law, and (6)
any Executive Branch interpretation. Utilizing such a broad analytical
framework-from the NPT's ordinary meaning and historical
understanding to more contemporary state practice and legal regimesproduces a clearer understanding of U.S. international obligations with
regard to providing nuclear weapons security assistance.
A. OrdinaryMeaning
The Supreme Court has espoused that "[iun construing a treaty, as in
construing a statute, [this Court will] first look to its terms to determine
its meaning."1 33 Treaties should be "liberally construed, so as to carry
out the apparent intention of the parties" and "in their construction,
words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the
public law of nations, and not in any artificial or special sense
impressed upon them by local law, unless such restricted sense is
clearly intended." 34 The Court has placed a caveat on this proposition
by noting that "[t]he clear import of treaty language controls unless
'application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious
meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of
its signatories."'l 35 The Supreme Court's interpretation is somewhat
consistent with the approach taken by the VCLT. Article 31 of the
VCLT states that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." 3 6 The
VCLT also approves of "supplementary means of interpretation" if
133. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992) (citing Air France v.
Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985).
134. De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890). See In re The Amiable Isabella, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821) ("to alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause,
whether small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of power, and
not an exercise ofjudicial functions.").
135. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (quoting
Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (emphasis added)).
136. VCLT, supra note 123, art. 3 1(1). The International Court of Justice (ICJ), which
recognizes the VCLT as customary international law, (see Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, 41 (Feb. 3)) has noted that "the first duty" of
treaty interpretation "is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning
in the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning
make sense in their context, that is [the] end of the matter." Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8
(Mar. 3).
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relying on more traditional methods "leads to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 3 7
1. Transfer Provision
The breadth in which the Transfer Provision was written underscores
its significance. By prohibiting a NWS from "transfer[ing] . . . control"

of a nuclear weapon or device "to any recipient whatsoever" (as
opposed to simply a "State Party" or a "NNWS"), the NPT mandates an
extensive commitment against nuclear proliferation between any
country, regardless of nuclear weapons status.' 38 A review of the
common understanding of the terms "transfer" and "control" at the time
the NPT was being negotiated and completed, illustrates that the
framers did not anticipate Article I to prohibit NWS from aiding any
country (i.e., NWS, NNWS, NPT Party, or non-NPT Party) in securing
their nuclear assets.
During the timeframe in which the NPT was being drafted, the
ordinary meaning of "control" meant "t o exercise restraining or
directing influence over; [t]o regulate.' 9 In the strictest sense,
providing Islamabad with nuclear surety assistance is an attempt to have
Islamabad gain more "direct[] influence over" its own nuclear weapons.
However, because Pakistan is already in "control" of its weapons (as
opposed to the U.S.- or ally-control) there is no "transfer" of control,
which is the NPT's stated prohibition. During NPT negotiations and
completion, the ordinary meaning of "transfer" was to "pass or hand
over from one to another; specifqically] to make over the possession or
control of."' 40 Clearly, by providing Islamabad with nuclear security
assistance, Washington is not transferring control over one of its own
nuclear weapons or devices; but rather, said assistance permits Pakistan
to gain greater "control" over its already existing nuclear arsenal. Under
this scenario, there simply is no change of nuclear possession, and thus,
the exchange of nuclear surety measures does not violate the ordinary
meaning of the terms in the Transfer Provision.

137. VCLT, supra note 123, art. 32(b). The ICJ has also held that if applying the "natural
and ordinary meaning of the words employed in the [treaty] provision .. . results in a meaning
incompatible with the spirit, purpose and context of the clause or instrument in which the words
are contained, no reliance can be validly placed on it." South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber.
v. S. Afr.) Preliminary Objections, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 336 (Dec. 21).
138. NPT, supra note 14, art. 1.
139. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 399 (4th ed. 1951) [hereinafter BLACK'S]. This is the

verb" form definition of "control" and, although BLACK'S also provides a "noun" definition,
the grammatical context in which the NPT is written renders the former definition more
appropriate for analysis.
140. Id. at 1669.
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2. Assistance Provision
Compared to the "Transfer Provision," the "Assistance Provision"
only vaguely describes NWS obligations under the NPT. Here, NWS
undertake "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any [NNWS]
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices." 1 41 During NPT negotiations, the ordinary meaning of the term
"assist" meant "[t]o help; aid; [or, t]o contribute effort in the complete
accomplishment of an ultimate purpose intended to be effected by those
engaged." 42 Additionally, "encourage" could be understood to mean
"[t]o instigate; to incite to action; to give courage to; to inspirit; to
embolden; to raise confidence; to help" 43 and "induce" meant "[t]o
bring on or about, to affect, to cause, to influence to an act or course of
conduct lead by overall persuasion or reasoning." 44 A common
understanding of "manufacture" was a "process of making products by
hand or machinery"l 4 5 and the term "acquire" meant "[t]o gain by any
means, usually by one's own exertions; to obtain by search, endeavor,
practice or purchase; receive. ,,146
Providing nuclear surety assistance to Islamabad is not, by the
ordinary meaning of the terms, equivalent to "assist[ing],
encourage[ing], or induc[ing]" a NNWS to "acquire . . . control over

[nuclear] weapons or [nuclear] explosive devices." Islamabad already
has "direct influence over"1 47 its nuclear weapons, and thus, it is not
attempting "to gain by any means" or "to obtain" control over a nuclear
weapon already in its own possession. Therefore, because providing
Pakistan with nuclear surety measures is not the equivalent to
permitting Pakistan to "acquire" control over more nuclear weapons and
devices, said aid does not violate the ordinary meaning of these terms.
Although the analysis required to understand the "acquire . . .
control" proviso in Article I is straightforward, interpreting the
prohibition on "assist[ing], encourag[ing], or induc[ing]" a NNWS to
"manufacture" a nuclear weapon is more complex. In fact, given the
breadth of Article I, an argument can be made that providing any aid
whatsoever-nuclear or non-nuclear-could be interpreted as
"assist[ing]" in the "manufacture" of nuclear weapons or devices.
According to National Defense Specialist Sharon Squassoni, an
141. NPT, supranote 14, art. I.
142.

BLACK'S, supra note 139, at 155.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 620.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 41.
See supra note 139.
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"extreme" interpretation of Article I would mean that any type of aid,
even food or humanitarian aid, could constitute "assist[ing]" in the
development of a nuclear weapon because this international support
would "free up resources that the target government can put toward a
nuclear weapons program."l 48 Article I's NWS restrictions regarding
"encourag[ing]" or "induc[ing]" a NNWS from manufacturing a nuclear
weapon are "even broader and more nebulous than [those] against
assistance . . ."149 One scholar notes, for example, that a NWS's mere
vocal support for a NNWS to build a nuclear wea on could be
interpreted as "encourag[ment]" under Article I."'
Of course,
interpreting the NPT in this extreme manner (such as banning all aid
from NWS to NNWS) would lead to an absurd result and further
analysis is required.15 1
Squassoni notes that the "closer assistance is attached to the nuclear
weapons programs, the more likely that it could run afoul of U.S. legal
obligations. . . ."52 However, it is my contention that by examining the
context in which Article I was written, one can find evidence that the
"assist, encourage, or induce" prohibitions were never intended to
prohibit the international exchange of nuclear surety measures to
existing nuclear weapons, regardless of how closely attached such aid is
to a nuclear weapons program. As noted in the NPT's introductory
paragraphs,

"the proliferation

of nuclear

weapons

...

seriously

enhance[s] the danger of nuclear war," which would undoubtedly cause
"devastation . . . upon all mankind."' 53 The Proclamation also provides

that although the peaceful use of nuclear technology can be beneficial to
states, the transfer and use of such technology and materials must be
conducted under an international verification framework.154 In sum, the
148. NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION, supra note 12, at 17. Squassoni notes that generic

forms of international aid, like humanitarian aid, are permitted to NNWS because it does not
have "a close association with a nuclear weapons program." Id.
149.

WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 94.

150. Id. Willrich notes that "[tihe range of possible activities by nuclear-weapon states
which constitute assistance, encouragement or inducement under the [NPT] might develop into
a fertile field for future legal controversy, if the parties choose to pour the foreign policy process
into this form." Id. at 94-95.
151. Banning all forms of assistance to a NNWS would lead to a "manifestly absurd or
unreasonable" result for several reasons, including that such an interpretation would actually
contradict other provisions of the NPT. VCLT, supra note 123, art. 32(b). For example, under
Article III, NWS are permitted to assist NNWS by transferring nuclear material to NNWS, so
long as appropriate safeguards are in place. NPT, supra note 14, art. III. See also id. art. IV
(outlining the ability for states to "exchange . . . equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for peaceful . . . uses . . ."); id. art. V (describing how the "potential
benefits .. . of nuclear explosions will be made available to [NNWS].").
152. NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION, supra note 12, at 17.

153. NPT, supra note 14, Proclamation.

154. Id.
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very purpose of the NPT is to allow the peaceful use of nuclear
technology while simultaneously preventing the spread and
development of nuclear weapons. By providing Pakistan with nuclear
surety aid, the United States would be upholding the spirit of the NPT.
For instance, if Pakistan has greater control over its already existing
nuclear weapons, materials, and technology, it can better ensure that
they are not proliferated to, or accessed by, terrorist organizations. In
addition, the sharing of nuclear weapon surety measures would both
increase Islamabad's own control over its nuclear arsenal and decrease
the possibility that nuclear materials could be smuggled out of the
country through a black market proliferation network. Thus,
establishing greater nuclear weapon surety in Pakistan will ultimately
"deter proliferation networks, terrorist groups, and insiders from
threatening the security of Islamabad's nuclear weapons,"155 which
coincides with the NPT's stated nonproliferation goal and purpose.
Further, there is nothing in the NPT that actually prohibits NNWS
from possessing nuclear weapons.1 56 Providing nuclear surety aid to an
already existing nuclear arsenal, is not that same as "assist[ing],
encourage[ing], or induc[ing]" in the "manufacture" or "acqui[sition]"
of more nuclear weapons. The NPT's "assistance" prohibition, by its
ordinary meaning, restricts international aid to the "process of making"
a nuclear weapon, and does not necessarily prohibit assistance to a postmanufactured nuclear arsenal. Thus, as long as the nuclear security
assistance measures (i.e., use-control technology, nuclear facility
structure improvements, funding, and nuclear surety best practices) are
applied to an existing nuclear weapons arsenal, there is no conflict with
the NPT. On the other hand, a NWS may not supply a NNWS with
facility upgrades to a nuclear weapons manufacturing power plant or
use-control technology that needs to be inputted into a nuclear weapon
during the manufacturing stage because such assistance directly helps in
the "manufactur[ing]" of a nuclear weapon. Therefore, in order to
coincide with Article I, nuclear surety assistance must be tailored to
completed nuclear weapons.
Some may argue that by providing nuclear security assistance to an
already existing Pakistani nuclear arsenal, will "assist, encourage, or
induce" Pakistan (or any other NNWS) to alter its pre-manufacturing
behavior in a manner inconsistent with the NPT. Essentially, this
argument implies that the United States is not opposed to NNWS
manufacturing nuclear weapons so long as said weapons are under
appropriate security controls to prevent proliferation to terrorists or
rogue states. Regardless of the sincerity of this argument, it lacks a high
155. Joshi & Kassenova, supra note 12.
156. Supra note 14, arts. I & II.
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degree of credibility because providing nuclear surety assistance to
Islamabad will actually decrease the possibility that it will manufacture
more nuclear weapons.
Pakistan has already declared that it has manufactured the quantity
of nuclear weapons necessary to achieve a "minimum credible nuclear
deterrent."' 5 7 By ensuring that Pakistan has effective nuclear weapon
surety measures, Islamabad will not need to manufacture more nuclear
arms out of the fear of loss, degradation, theft, or sabotage to its existing
nuclear arsenal. Rather, Pakistan will be able to maintain its nuclear
arsenal at its current deterrent-effective level. Further, the United States
may (as it does with other countries) provide a combination of
assistance-and-sanction mechanisms towards Pakistan.15 8 Washington
may simultaneously assist Islamabad with nuclear surety and sanction
the country in other areas if it continues to manufacture nuclear
weapons. This will help ensure a clear message: the United States will
work towards securing existing nuclear arsenals, yet it does not approve
of a NNWS manufacturing additional nuclear arms.
Concluding this analysis, one can note that Article I, by its plain
meaning and context, does not create a blanket prohibition of NWS
providing nuclear security assistance to a NNWS. Nuclear security aid
actually supports the nonproliferation goals and objectives of the NPT.
However, this form of assistance is only permissible if it is applied
toward an existing nuclear arsenal, as opposed to the manufacturing of
new weapons. As will be illustrated below, employing other tools of
treaty construction supports this interpretation of the NPT.
B. Travaux Prdparatoires
In the United States, courts often examine the history and
59
negotiations surrounding a treaty in order to ascertain its meaning.' As
157. See CHIPMAN, supra note 19, at 33.
158. See, e.g., Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-293, 120 Stat. 1344
(2006); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996)
(permitting sanctions against people that invest in certain areas of the Iranian economy, and
noting that such sanctions may not apply to medicines, medical supplies, or other humanitarian
items); Compare North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-333, 118 Stat 1287
(2004) with Exec. Order No. 13,466, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,787 (June 26, 2008) (allowing
humanitarian assistance for North Koreans while also mandating the continuation of certain
sanctions).
159. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) ("Because a treaty
ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land . . . but also an agreement among
sovereign powers, we have traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating
and drafting history (travaux prdparatoires) and the postratification understanding of the
contracting parties."); Air France,470 U.S. 392, 401 (1985) ("In interpreting a treaty it is proper
... to refer to the records of its drafting and negotiation.") (citing Choctaw Nation of Indians v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)).
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the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law notes, domestic courts "are
generally more willing than those of other states to look outside the
instrument to determine its meaning." 60 This approach is consistent
with Article 32 of the VCLT, which states that "[r]ecourse may be had
to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to

confirm [a term's ordinary] meaning."'61 Mason Willrichl 62 and
Mohammed Ibrahim Shaker1 3 have each elaborately researched and
published detailed scholarship on the negotiating history of the NPT. An
analysis of these works, and the travaux prdparatoires in general,
confirms the interpretation that the "Transfer Provision" of Article I was
never intended to prohibit security assistance. Unfortunately, the
negotiating history regarding the "Assistance Provision" only provides a
limited clarification on what nuclear cooperation aid is actually
prohibited.
1. Transfer Provision
The international negotiations leading to the NPT, which took place
primaril 4 in Geneva, Switzerland, are generally viewed as a two-part
process. 64 First, the United States and Soviet Union negotiated "the
substantive issues to be incorporated in the draft [NPT]."l 6 5 Second,
identical American-Soviet NPT drafts were transmitted to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which made modifications
and sent a final version of the NPT to the U.N. General Assembly for
approval.166 During the first stage of NPT discussions, "[tihe meaning
160.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra

note 132, cmt. G.
161. VCLT, supra note 123, art. 32. Article 32 notes that this "recourse" should only be
applied after determining that the treaty interpretation methods described in Article 31: "(a)
leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable." Id. The ICJ consistently affirms this principle. See, e.g., Avena & Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 48-50 (Mar. 31); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan &
Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 625, 646-52 (Dec. 17).
162. WILLRICH, supra note 131. From 1962 to 1975, Mason Willrich served as Assistant
General Counsel in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Committee and, during that
timeframe, he served on U.S. Delegations to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in
Geneva and to the IAEA in Vienna. Id. at Publisher's Note.
163. MOHAMED I. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND
IMPLEMENTATION 1959-1979, Vols. I-III (Oceana Publications Inc. 1980).

164. Dimitris Bourantonis, The Negotiation of the Non-ProlferationTreaty, 1965-1968, 19
INT'L HIST. REv. 347, 347 (1997).

165. Id.
166. Id. The ENDC was an "autonomous body outside the permanent framework of the
[United Nations], to which, at the suggestion of the United States and the Soviet Union,
disarmament negotiations were transferred by the [G]eneral [Aissembly under Resolution 1,722
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of 'control' and the related Soviet concept of 'access' were the major
language barriers between the United States and the Soviet Union for
the five years of negotiations until the agreement was reached in 1967
on Articles I and II."I 67 An examination of this topic reveals that the
NPT's framers intended Article I to prohibit a NNWS from transferring
actual command and control authority of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear military alliances, as opposed to restricting security assistance
measures to existing nuclear arsenals.
As NPT negotiations were underway, the United States had already
deployed approximately 7000 nuclear warheads across Western
Europe.' 68 Although these weapons remained in the physical control of
American Armed Forces in Europe, the United States had already
provided many European allies-who were technically NNWS-with
nuclear weapon delivery capabilities.1 6 9 Additionally, during this
period, the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) members were negotiating the creation of an international
military body with nuclear-weapon sharing capability.' 70 The original
frameworks that were discussed (i.e., the Multilateral Nuclear Force
(MNF) 17 1 and the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF))1 72 failed because of he
of 20 Dec. 1961." Id. The ENDC was composed of five states from both the "Western bloc" and
the "Soviet bloc," respectively, and of eight "non-aligned states." Id.
167. WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 71.
168. Id. at 73 (citing Testimony of Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, Hearings on
the Status of U.S. Strategic Power, Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess, Pt. 2, at 235 (1968)).
169. Id. at 73-74. Willrich noted that Washington "ha[d] sold to certain non-nuclear
weapon [North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)] allies large numbers of aircraft and
surface-to-surface missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons." Id. at 74.
170. Id at 77-87; SHAKER, supranote 163, at 129-89.
171. The United States believed the MLF should meet four conditions: (1) be assigned to
NATO by the participating countries, as opposed to any one country; (2) be spread evenly
across the member-countries so that one country was not the MLF's primary base of operation;
(3) be managed by nationals from all the member countries; and (4) the use of the international
force should have a collective decision making process. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 138.
Throughout the MLF discussions, the United States sought to obtain a "veto" authority over
whether this international body could use nuclear weapons. Id. at 170.
172. Great Britain proposed the ANF which differed from the MNF in five respects: (1)
British contributions to the ANF would have come from existing forces, instead of newly
constituted forces that were needed in the MNF; (2) Britain would have had greater influence in
the ANF and would have been on "an equal footing with the United States," whereas the Federal
Republic of Germany had more influence in the MNF; (3) in the ANF there was no option for
the possible formation of a European Union that would control nuclear weapons obtained from a
NNWS that had transferred and then relinquished all of its nuclear arms (the "European
option"); (4) all British nuclear deterrent forces would have been committed to the MNF; and
(5) the ANF would have been "more powerful and invulnerable than the MLF." Id. at 177-78.
Willrich refers to the ANF as the "Allied Nuclear Force." See WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 8387.
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problems associated with permitting the joint ownership of nuclear
weapons with NATO allies.173 In response, the United States and
NATO settled on the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).174
The NPG, which was created in 1967, established the principal forum to
coordinate and plan nuclear strategy among NATO-member states.175
The NPG was significant in that it established a "framework for
discussions on nuclear strategy" where there would be "sharing of
[nuclear] knowledge and planning," as opposed to the MNF and ANF,
which permitted the "sharing of ownership and control" of nuclear
weapons. 76
It was against this backdrop in which the obligations and
prohibitions in NPT, Article I evolved. The first American draft of the
NPT was submitted on August 17, 1965 (prior to the formation of the
NPG) and mandated that each NWS "undertakes not to transfer any
nuclear weapons into the national control of any [NNWS], either
directly, or indirectly through a military alliance" nor to "take any other
action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and
other organizations having independent power to use nuclear
weapons."177 This draft language "left open the possibility of
establishing a [MNF] within NATO which, as the United States
explained, would not have led to the indirect transfer of nuclear
weapons to the national control of any non-nuclear State."' 7 8 Instead,
the MNF, which was not considered a "national" entity, could be
permitted to deploy nuclear weapons so long as it acted with the consent
of its members and not with any "independent power." 79 Given that it
was "vehemently opposed to the MLF and other forms of nuclear
sharing within NATO," the Soviet Union, as well as other nations,
criticized the August 17 draft for creating a loophole that would permit

173. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 187; WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 83-87.
174. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 183-87; WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 77. See also NATO

HANDBOOK 151-52 (NATO Office of Information and Press 2001).
175.

SHAKER, supra note 163, at 183-87; NATO HANDBOOK, supra note 174, at 151 ("[t]he

Defence Ministers of member countries which take part in NATO's Defence Planning
Committee meet at regular intervals in the [NPG], where they discuss specific policy issues
associated with nuclear forces.").
176. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 186.
177. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON
THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 133-34 (1969) [hereinafter
NEGOTIATIONS] (emphasis added). See WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 82; SHAKER, supra note

163, at 215.
178. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 215-16 (citing ENDC/PV, 228, Aug. 31, 1965, at 38)
(emphasis added). WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 82.
179. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 215-16; WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 82. The term
national control "was understood to mean the individual national possession of nuclear weapons
and the capability to use them independently." Id. at 216. See WILLRICH, supranote 131, at 83.
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some degree of nuclear sharing within NATO. 8 0
On September 24, 1965, the Soviet delegation submitted their first
NPT draft, which restricted NWS from transferring nuclear weapons to
the "ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing
nuclear weapons and not to accord to such States or groups of States the
right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear
weapons.' 1 The draft also prohibited NWS from transferring "nuclear
weapons, or control over them or over their emplacement and use, to
units of the armed forces or military personnel of [NNWS], even if such
units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance." 82
Lastly, the Soviet's draft prohibited the transferring of any kind of
"information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of
the . . . use of nuclear weapons."' 8 3 The broad restrictions in the Soviet
text, which prohibited any degree of NATO nuclear weapon sharing,
were obviously met with American disapproval.184
However, as the United States and its NATO allies distanced
themselves from creating a MNF, the U.S. delegation submitted
amendments to its original draft treaty on March 21, 1966. ss Under this
draft, Article I mandated that a NWS would not "transfer nuclear
weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear weapons State, or
into the control of any association of [NNWS]" nor "take any other
action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and
associations of States having control of nuclear weapons." 86 The
United States defined "control" to mean "right or ability to fire nuclear
weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing [NWS]."18 7
Although this new draft restricted some types of nuclear sharing that
were permitted in the earlier August 1965 draft, the fact that it allowed
for any sharing caused "heated controversy between the United States
and the Soviet Union." 88 According to the Soviets, a non-proliferation
180. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 217-18 (citations omitted).
181.

NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 136. See also SHAKER, supra note 163, at 227.

182. NEGOTIATIONS, supranote 177, at 136. See also SHAKER, supra note 163, at 227.
183.

NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 136. See also SHAKER, supranote 163, at 227.

184. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 227-30. In response to the Soviet draft, U.S.
Undersecretary of State George Ball stated, "we are very determined that we are not going to
invite the Soviet Union to sit at the NATO table and determine NATO nuclear policy." Id. at
229 (quoting Dep't of State Bull., Vol. LV, No. 1413, July 23, 1966, at 122); see also
WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 72.
185. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 140. See also SHAKER, supra note 163, at 221;
WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 82-83.
186. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 140. See also SHAKER, supra note 163, at 221;
WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 82-83.
187. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 140. See SHAKER, supra note 163, at 222;
WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 83.
188. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 223.
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treaty "should prohibit any transfer by a nuclear Power of nuclear
weapons, conditionally or unconditionally, to a non-nuclear State."' 8 9
The American-Soviet debate over the extent of a permissible NATO
nuclear sharing agreement deadlocked NPT negotiations until the
United States "gave up all efforts to create a [MNF] within NATO.190
After months of diplomacy (and a shift in U.S.-NATO policy from a
MNF to a NPG), the United States and Soviet Union agreed on a draft
treaty, which they submitted on August 24, 1967.1' Article I of this
draft treaty was incorporated verbatim in the final NPT treaty and does
not include the Soviet prohibition of sharing nuclear information with
NNWS, which is compatible with the development of the NPG in
NATO. 9 2 Additionally, Article I of the NPT prohibits the transfer of
"control" over nuclear weapons to "any recipient whatsoever."l 93 This
is again consistent with the NPG, which prohibits the actual transfer of
nuclear weapons within NATO.1 4 Thus, the final version of the NPT
includes a compromise that ensures both U.S. and Soviet concerns are
alleviated. Based upon this negotiating history, the "Transfer Clause"
specifically prohibits NNWS from providing "physical custody" of their
nuclear weapons or "sufficient access to them so that they could be
taken away by anyone else; nor can the [NWS] give up their power to
make the final decision on firing their nuclear weapons." 9 s However,
Article I does permit allied consultation on nuclear strategy and the
deployment of nuclear weapons in allied territory, as long as said
weapons remain in the "control" of a NWS.1 96 In sum, analyzing the
189. Id. at 225 (quoting ENDC/PV. 269, 30 June 1966, at 34). The U.S. delegation
believed that the Soviets were "less than candid" during negotiations because the latter had
Warsaw Pact allies who "were being trained in the use of nuclear weapons." Id. at 224 (citation
omitted).
190. WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 84.
191. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 146. See SHAKER, supra note 163, at 232.

192. See supra text accompanying notes 174-76.
193. NPT, supra note 14, art. I.
194. Supra text accompanying notes 181-83.
195. SHAKER, supranote 163, at 249 (quoting Eric Stein, Legal Restraints in Modern Arms
ControlAgreements, 66 AMER. J. INT'L L. 255-89 (1972)).
196. Mason Willrich, The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear
Technology Confronts World Politics, 77 YALE L.J. 1447, 1470-71 (1968) [hereinafter Nuclear
Technology]. Willrich discusses this issue in depth:
Thus, we are driven toward an interpretation of "control" which focuses on the
actual decision to use nuclear weapons. If a non-nuclear-weapon state could
make a unilateral and effective decision to use nuclear weapons, it would
clearly have control-a "finger on the trigger" - whether or not it had physical
possession of the weapons. On the other hand, if use of a nuclear weapon by a
nuclear-weapon state required concurrence of a non-nuclear-weapon state, then
the non-nuclear-weapon state would have control in a negative sense. However,
this kind of decisional control-a "finger on the safety catch" - would seem not
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travaux prdparatoires of the Transfer Provision confirms the ordinary
meaning of Article I, which is that a NWS is prohibited from
transferring actual physical control of a nuclear weapon or nuclear
launch decisional authority to any other state or organization. The
Transfer Provision therefore does not prohibit a NWS from providing
NNWS with nuclear-security capability.
2. Assistance Provision
In contrast to the extensively debated "Transfer Provision," the
"Assistance Provision" received limited attention during NPT
negotiations. The American's draft treaty of August 17, 1965 prohibited
NWS from "assist[ing] any [NNWS] in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons."' 97 The Soviets' September 24, 1965 draft went a step further
and prohibited NWS from providing assistance to NNWS "in
preparations for the manufacture" of nuclear weapons and transmitting
to

NNWS

"any

kind

of manufacturing

. . . information

or

documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture
or use of nuclear weapons."' 98 The U.S. amended draft, submitted on
March 21, 1966, attempted to reconcile the difference: NWS were
prohibited from providing a NNWS with "(a) assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparation for such manufacture
... ; or (b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture . . . nuclear

weapons."

99

At the ENDC, the Swedish delegation focused on international
assistance and the risks associated with pre-manufacturing nuclear
developments.200 For example, Swiss Representative Myrdal stated that
manufacturing nuclear weapons is comparable to a "long ladder with
many rungs" and that "the practical question is: on which of these is it
reasonable and feasible to introduce international blocking?" 201
Representative Myrdal warned that to "prohibit just the final act of

to be the kind of control which the [NPT] is intended to prevent non-nuclear
states from acquiring.
Id.
197. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 133-34. See also WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 91.
198. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 136. See SHAKER, supra note 163, at 249;
wILLRICH, supra note 131, at 91.
199. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 140. See SHAKER, supra note 163, at 249;
wILLRICH, supra note 131, at 91-92.
200. See SHAKER, supra note 163, at 250; see also WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 91.
201. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 250 (quoting Representative Myrdal) (citation omitted);
WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 91 (citation omitted).
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'manufacture' would seem to come late in these long chains of
decisions." 202
Despite these concerns, the final version of the NPT to which the
United States and Soviet Union agreed upon omits any "reference at all
to preparations for manufacture, either in relation to prohibited nuclearweapon state assistance or to prohibited non-nuclear-weapon state
activities." 2 03 Based on the fact that the NPT specifically excludes the
"preparation to manufacture" restriction that was in two previous drafts,
one can credibly argue that the NPT does not prohibit NWS from
"assist[ing], encoura Sing], or induc[ing]" a NNWS in prethis undoubtedly leads to ambiguity
manufacturing efforts. 4Although
in distinguishing between "manufacturing" and "pre-manufacturing"
activity, the fact that there is such a difference at all is significant in that
205
it creates more flexibility in interpreting acceptable behavior.
The "Assistance Provision's" restrictions on a NWS from
"assist[ing], encourag[ing], or induc[ing]" a NNWS to "manufacture ...
nuclear weapons" are, according to Willrich, "broad, vague, and in large
The first NPT
measure susceptible only of subjective appraisal."
drafts submitted by the Americans and the Soviets contain prohibitions
on "assist[ing]" NNWS in the manufacture of nuclear weapons-and
the preparation thereof, respectively. 20 7 It was not until the United
States submitted their amendments in March 1966 that the terms
44
or "induce" appeared. 208 This language "has its origin in
encourage"
Article I of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which prohibits any
party from 'causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in' a
nuclear weapon test explosion conducted by any state in a prohibited
environment."2 0 9 However, only a few countries actually discussed the

202. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 250. Myrdal was searching for a middle ground and
discussed the difficulty associated with determining when pre-manufacturing activity evidenced
a nuclear weapon program, which could lead to "undesirable intervention" by the international
community. Id.
203. WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 92. See NPT, supra note 14, art. I.
204. WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 92. See SHAKER, supra note 163, at 256.

205. For instance, during NPT negotiations, the Swiss government declared that
"exploitation of uranium deposits, enrichment of uranium, extraction of plutonium from nuclear
fuels, or manufacture of fuel elements or heavy water, when the processes are carried out for
civil purposes" does not constitute "manufacturing" of nuclear weapons. SHAKER, supra note
163, at 250 (citation omitted). Some may contend that although this activity may not be
considered the "manufacturing" of nuclear weapons, it could be interpreted as part of the "premanufacturing" of a nuclear weapon, which was no longer prohibited by the American-Soviet
draft version of the NPT.
206. Nuclear Technology, supra note 196, at 1475.
207. Supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
208. NEGOTIATIONS, supranote 177, at 140. See SHAKER, supra note 163, at 256.
209. WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 94. See also SHAKER, supra note 163, at 256.
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scope of this prohibition in the context of the NPT, and, unfortunately,
these concerns are not germane to this analysis.210
C. Domestic RatificationHistory
Although not specifically referenced by the VCLT as a method for
interpreting international agreements, the Supreme Court has stated that
the domestic ratification history may assist in "giving effect to the intent
of the Treaty parties." 211 As Justice Brennan indicated, preratification
Senate debates are relevant to determining meaning of a treaty because
they "do not occur behind closed doors, out of earshot of proposed
treaty partners, nor are preratification Senate reports kept under seal.
Both are public statements." 212 Similar to the travaux prdparatoires,
the NPT's ratification history illustrates that the Senate was not overtly
concerned with NWS-to-NNWS nuclear security assistance; rather, it
wanted to ensure that the NPT did not infringe upon any U.S.-NATO
agreement or obligation.
1. Transfer Provision
In 1966, the U.S. Senate became more vocal in its support for an
international nonproliferation agreement when the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy held hearings on a draft resolution submitted by Senator
John 0. Pastore.213 The hearings led to the Pastore Resolution, which
emphasized the dangers of nuclear proliferation and advocated that the
Johnson Administration continue to work with the global community to
resolve these concerns. 2 14 The Senate's hearings on the resolution
illustrated that it did not intend to amend "the prohibition in the Atomic
Energy Act [of 1954] on the 'transfer' of atomic weapons in foreign
210. WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 96-98; SHAKER, supra note 164, at 257-59. For example,
the United Arab Republic voiced concerns that Articles I and II was not broad enough in that
they not prohibit NNWS-to-NNWS cooperation or NWS-to-private entity cooperation. Id.
(citations omitted). Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union attempted to incorporate
these concerns. Id. (citations omitted).
211. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc.
457 U.S. 276, 185 (1982)).
212. Id. n.7. Justice Brennan also quoted the Restatement in his opinion: "indication that . .
the Senate ascribed a particular meaning to the treaty is relevant" and "[a] court ... is required
to take into account ... (i) Committee reports, debates, and other indications of meaning that the
legislative branch has attached to an agreement.

. . ."

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT , supra note

132, § 314, cmt. D); id. § 325, Reporters' n.5.
213. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 29. See also George Bunn, The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 766, 769-70 (1968); SHAKER, supra note 163, at
100-01.
214. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 29-30 (citation omitted). See also SHAKER, supra

note 163, at 100-01.
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commerce," 215 which ultimately prohibited the United States from
supplying a MLF with nuclear weapons. 2 16 The American-Soviet
compromise regarding Article I, which prohibits the physical transfer of
nuclear weapons to allies and permits nuclear cooperation with NATO
allies, essentially "affirms the legal status quo as far as the United States
[was] concerned." 2 17 As Willrich explains, under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, the United States was prohibited from "transfer[ing] to
another nation an entire nuclear weapon or the nuclear parts of a nuclear
weapon" but was permitted to "provide assistance related to a nuclear
weapons program only to a state which has already acquired nuclear
weapons. 218 "The restraints in the [NPT] are," according to Willrich,
"in all major respects the same as the inhibitions the United States has
already placed on itself."2 19
Consistent with the Pastore resolution hearings, the Senate's NPT
advice and consent 220 hearings provide evidence that the restrictions in
"Transfer Provision" only apply to the actual physical transfer of a
nuclear weapon and not NWS-to-NNWS nuclear weapon security
assistance. In 1968, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent to President
Johnson a "Report on the [NPT]," which the President subsequently
attached to the "Letter of Submittal" to the U.S. Senate.221 In the
Report, Rusk declared that Article I's nuclear transfer restriction does
not go beyond U.S. law, but instead "deliberately parallels United States
atomic energy legislation." 222 As an attachment to the Report, Rusk
included certain questions raised by allies with respect to Article I as
well as U.S. responses.2 23 Responding to the question "[w]hat may and
what may not be transferred" under Article I, Rusk stated, and thus it
was the Senate's understanding at the time of the advice and consent
hearings, that the NPT "deals only with what is prohibited, not with
what is permitted."22 4 According to Rusk, the NPT "does not deal with,
215. Bunn, supranote 213, at 769-70.
216. Id. See also SHAKER, supra note 163, at 100-01; NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 29-

31. The Pastore Resolution passed the Senate by an 84-0 vote. Bunn, supra note 213, at 769
n.26 (citing S. Res. 179, 89th Cong., (1966)).
217. WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 72.

218. Id. at 73.
219. Id. See also Bunn, supra note 213, at 770-71.
220. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the President "shall have Power, with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.").
221. Report by Sec'y of State Rusk to President Johnson on the Nonproliferation Treaty.
NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 173-80.

222. Id. at 175.
223. U.S. Sec'y of State Dean Rusk, Questions on the Draft [NPT] Asked by U.S. Allies
Together With Answers Given by the United States. Id. at 180. See also SHAKER, supra note
163, at 234-35.
224. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 180. See SHAKER, supra note 163, at 234-35.
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and therefore does not prohibit,transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or
delivery systems, or control over them . . . ."225 Nor does the NPT "deal
with allied consultation and planning on nuclear defense so long as no
transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results." 226 However,
Rusk noted that the NPT "prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever
of 'nuclear weapons' or control over them . . ." 2 This was consistent
with President Johnson's Message to the Senate on the NPT: "[The
NPTs] basic undertaking was deliberately patterned after United States
atomic energy legislation, which forbids transfers of our nuclear
weapons to others." 228
Based upon this historical review of the NPT's ratification, one can
see that the United States was only binding itself under the "Transfer
Provision" to the prohibition on the physical transfer of nuclear
weapons to allies. As Rusk stated, and the Senate understood, the NPT
"deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted." 229
Because one cannot find any effort to prohibit international nuclear
security assistance under Article I, it seems that at the time of
ratification is was understood that such assistance was permissible.
2. Assistance Provision
Although a review of the ratification history provides some insight
into how the United States interpreted the term "manufacture," it does
not illuminate any in-depth understanding on the restrictions mandated
by the "assist, encourage, or induce" terms. During the NPT's advice
and consent hearings the United States was unable to actually proffer a
definition of "manufacture." 230 Instead, U.S. officials only provided
"general observations" regarding what activity would be the equivalent
to providing a NNWS with assistance in the manufacturing of a nuclear
weapon.231 During the NPT Senate hearings, William Foster, Director

of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament, discussed how the Senate
should understand the term "manufacture" (which is also prohibited in
Article II):
For example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular
activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would
225. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 180 (emphasis added). See SHAKER, supra note
163, at 234-35.
226. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 180. See SHAKER, supra note 163, at 234-35.
227. NEGOTIATIONS, supranote 177, at 180. See SHAKER, supra note 163, at 234-35.
228. Message from President Johnson to the Senate on the [NPT], July 9, 1968.
NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 182.
229. NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 177, at 180.
230. SHAKER, supra note 163, at 234-35; WILLRICH, supra note 131, at 92-93.
231. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol23/iss1/1

34

Stransky: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Pakistan: Interpreting Nu

2011] THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATYAND PAKISTAN: INTERPRETING NUCLEAR SECURITY

35

tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of an
experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would be
covered by the term "manufacture" as would be the production of
components which would only have relevance to a nuclear
explosive device.) Again, while the placing of a particular
activity under safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the
question of whether that activity was in compliance with the
treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of
non-compliance.
It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several
activities which the United States would not consider per se to be
violations of the prohibition on article II. Neither uranium
enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable materials in
connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so
long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also
clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of
plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the
properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere
with the development of the use of fast breeder racers under

safeguards. 2 32
According to Foster's definition, IAEA safeguards would
significantly contribute to whether certain behavior would violate the
"manufacture" restriction. More significantly, though, is that Foster's
definition is concerned primarily, and most obviously, with premanufacturing activity (i.e., uranium enrichment, stockpiling of
fissionable materials) and not post-manufacture assistance (i.e., nuclear
surety measures). Although this definition is not exactly on point, it
does lend support to the nation that the prohibition on "manufacture"
does not include post-developed nuclear weapon security aid. In
accordance with the Dulles definition, providing Islamabad with nuclear
security aid would not in and of itself be considered a violation of the
U.S. obligation not to "assist, encourage or induce" a NNWS to
"manufacture" a nuclear weapon because the arsenal in question already
exists. Unfortunately, the ratification history does not provide more
detail on the scope of this or the "assist, encourage or induce"
prohibition.

232. NPT, supra note 14, art. II ("[e]ach [NNWS] Party to the Treaty undertakes not ... to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons ... and not to seek or receive any assistance
in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.").
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D. Subsequent State Practice
Examining state practice as a method of treaty interpretation has
become commonplace in both the domestic and international arena. For
example, in United States v. Stuart, Justice Brennan noted that "[t]he
practice of treaty signatories counts as evidence of the treaty's proper
interpretation, since their conduct generally evinces their understanding
of the agreement they signed." 233 Article 31 of the VCLT specifically
mandates that in interpreting a treaty "[t]here shall be taken into
account, together with the context ... [a]ny subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation. . . ."234 The ICJ has promoted the
International Law Commission's view on the subject:
The importance of such subsequent practice in the application of
the treaty, as an element of interpretation, is obvious; for it
constitutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties
as to the meaning of the treaty. Recourse to it as a means of
interpretation is well-established in the jurisprudence of
international tribunals.2 35
Given the limited number of NWS, as well as the privacy
surrounding nuclear programs, it is not difficult to understand why there
is not a plethora of examples of a NWS providing nuclear weapon
security to other countries. Yet, recent bi-lateral and multilateral nuclear
security arrangements provide some insight into how both NWS and
NNWS view Article I prohibitions, and they are useful in deducing
whether the United States may extend similar cooperation measures to
Pakistan without violating NPT obligations.
1. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Just prior to the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union,
Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) programs to reduce the threat of nuclear and other weapon of
233. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369 (citation omitted).
234. VCLT, supra note 123, art. 31(3)(b). One commentator notes that by examining state
practice "[wlords are given meaning by deeds. . . [and] ... concordant practice of the parties is
best evidence of [a treaty's]
INTERPRETATION 225 (2008).

correct

interpretation.

RICHARD

GARDINER,

TREATY

235. KasikililSedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, at 1075-76 (Dec. 13)
(citing 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMMissION 241 1 15 (1966)). The court also noted: "Indeed in the past,
when called upon to interpret the provisions of a treaty, the Court has itself frequently examined
the subsequent practice of the parties in the application of that treaty." Id. at 1076 (citations
omitted).
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mass destruction proliferation emanating from this time of chaos and
uncertainty.236 The initial purpose of CTR was to reduce the possibility
of proliferation by assisting the U.S.S.R, and its successor nations, with
the "safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement" of their
The programs have evolved over time to
nuclear weapon arsenal.
focus on providing these countries with broad nuclear weapon surety
measures, including: destruction and dismantlement of nuclear
weapons, chain of custody commands and procedures, and

demilitarization. 2 38
According to Amy F. Woolf, a specialist in national defense issues,
the destruction and dismantlement projects were implemented to
eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as well as their
delivery vehicles. 239 These projects have been instrumental in assisting
NWS (i.e., Russia) and NNWS (i.e., Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan)
in removing, deactivating, and eliminating nuclear arms and facilities. 24
The CTR's "chain of custody" projects were "designed to enhance the
safety, security, and control over nuclear weapons and fissile
materials." 24 1 These projects consisted of improving transportation
infrastructure in both NWS and NNWS in order to "enhance the safety
and security of warheads as they were transported from Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan to storage and dismantlement facilities in
Russia." 242 Additionally, under the CTR programs, Washington aided
Moscow in constructing nuclear storage facilities, improving protection,
control, and accounting procedures, and training military officials to
better protect sensitive nuclear technology and weapons. 4 3 Lastly, it
should be noted that the CTR programs were used to assist Russia and
other former Soviet states in transforming nuclear military efforts to
244
In 2004, Senator Lugar
peaceful research and development projects.
indicated that the CTR programs "deactivated more than 6300 nuclear
warheads as well as thousands of missiles and hundreds of bombers and
submarines. It has employed weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits and
236. See Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act § 211(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1991), Pub. L.
No. 102-228, 105 Stat. 1691, codified as amended by the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 5901 (1993). See generally AMY F. WOOLF, NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE
THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. for Cong., 971027 F (Mar. 23, 2001).
237. WOOLF, supra note 236, at 1.
238. Id. at 7. See generally James C. Kraska, Averting Nuclear Terrorism: Building a
Global Regime of Cooperative Threat Reduction, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 703, 724-38 (2005).
239. WOOLF, supra note 236, at 7.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. See generally Kraska, supra note 238, at 724-38.
243. WOOLF, supra note 236, at 7; Kraska, supra note 238, at 724-38.
244. WOOLF, supra note 236, at 8.
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provided security enhancements at nuclear, biological and chemical
sites. 55245
The cooperation between the United States and Russia (the framers
of Article I) in this area of nuclear security supports the notion that the
NPT was never intended to prohibit nuclear security assistance to either
NWS or NNWS. Between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
accession of all the former Soviet Union states to the NPT, the United
States, Russia, and other NNWS were deeply integrated in nuclear
security cooperation. 246 It should be noted that the NWS-to-NWS and
is undoubtedly
here
described
assistance
NWS-to-NNWS
distinguishable from providing nuclear security aid to Pakistan. For
example, the former Soviet Union NNWS inherited their nuclear
arsenal, as opposed to obtaining them through clandestine development.
Additionally, the underlying purpose of the CTR programs in the former
Soviet states was complete disarmament. However, regardless of these
discrepancies in circumstances, the international CTR program
cooperation exemplifies that the two drafters of Article I have been
deeply engaged in providing nuclear security assistance to both NWS
and NNWS. Such state practice provides evidence that Article I was
never intended to prohibit nuclear surety assistance and similar U.S.Pakistan aid would be permissible under the NPT.
2. Global Threat Reduction Initiative
In 2004, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) launched the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), which complements and expands
upon CTR programs. 247 GTRI's primary responsibility "is to address the
dangers posed by nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian
sites worldwide." 248 According to the DOE, "GTRI has three goalsConvert, Remove, and Protect-which provide a comprehensive
approach to achieving its mission and denying terrorists access to
nuclear and radiological materials." 249 DOE works with its international
245. Richard Lugar, Committed to Containing Nukes, WASH. POST, Oct 23. 2004, at A23.
246. Belarus acceded to the NPT in 1993; Kazakhstan acceded to the NPT in 1994; and
Ukraine joined the NPT in 1994. NTI: NPT Tutorial-Map of Key States, http://www.nti.org/h
leammore/npttutorial/mm 1_key states.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). Over 80 nuclear
warheads were removed from Belarus by 1996; by 1995, Kazakhstan had removed
approximately 1410 nuclear warheads; and, by 1996, all of Ukraine's inherited nuclear weapons
(approximately 370) were removed to Russia. Id.
247. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NAT'L NUCLEAR SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF GLOBAL THREAT
REDUCTION, STRATEGIC PLAN: REDUCING NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREAT WORLDWIDE 4

(2007), available at http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/GTRI -strategic
plan_2007.pdf [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN]. See Kraska, supra note 238, at 738-45.
248. STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 247, at 4.

249. Id. at 5.
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partners to "convert" nuclear reactors from using highly enriched
250
uranium to low enriched uranium.20 It also attempts to "remove" excess
nuclear and radiological materials that may be used in weapons of mass
destruction and to "protect" at-risk weapon-grade nuclear material from
unlawful access. 25 At its inception, the IAEA recognized that
"[i]nternational and global cooperation will be an integral part of the
GTRI initiative."2 52 The GTRI has attracted "immense international
attention"253 and, according to the DOE, the GTRI's global scope
includes cooperation and activity in more than 130 countries. 25 4 It must
be noted that in providing this nuclear assistance, the DOE does not
distinguish among NWS and NNWS. In fact, DOE's nuclear security
assistance measures are intended to stretch "worldwide" in order to
prevent the unlawful acquisition of dangerous materials and weapons
from any country. State practice in this nuclear security area-which is
evidenced by the tremendous amount of international cooperation and
support for the GTRI-also lends support that the notion that the NPT
does not prohibit nuclear weapon security assistance, including NWS
(United States) to NNWS (Pakistan) aid.
3. The G8 Global Partnership
In 2002, the Group of Eight (G8) adopted a Global Partnership
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
nonproliferation
"monumental
This
Partnership). 255
(Global
agreement"256 is intended to secure and dismantle nuclear materials and
equipment to ensure terrorist and rogue nations do not have the
necessary resources to construct a nuclear device.25 7 The "Principles" of
the Global Partnership specifically mandate that all countries "[d]evelop
and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure"
nuclear and other sensitive materials "in production, use, storage and
250. Id. at 5-6. See generally Kraska, supra note 238, at 738-45.
251. STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 247, at 5, 8-13. See generally Kraska, supra note 238, at
738-45.
252. IAEA Staff Report, IAEA Welcomes U.S. New Global Threat Reduction Initiative
(May 27, 2004), available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/GTRIInitiative.
html.
253. Kraska, supra note 238, at 739.
254. Dep't of Energy, Nat'I Nuclear Sec. Admin., Office of Global Threat Reduction,
GTRI World Map, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/GTRIcooperation
map 2008.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
255. See P'ship for Global Sec., The G8 Global P'shipAgainst the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.partnershipforglobal
security. org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=globalpartnershipagreementtext.pdf [hereinafter G8]. See
generally Kraska, supra note 238, at 745-57.
256. Kraska, supra note 238, at 745-46.
257. G8, supra note 255, at 1. See generally, Kraska, supranote 238, at 745-57.
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domestic and international transport" and "provide assistance to states
lacking sufficient resources to account for and secure these items."258
Further, the Global Partnership's framework indicates that all
countries should "[d]evelop and maintain appropriate effective physical
protection measures applied to facilities which house such items,
including defence in depth; [and] provide assistance to states lacking
sufficient resources to protect their facilities." 259 Although it initially
focused on securing nuclear materials in Russia and other former Soviet
Union states, in 2008 the G8 announced that the Global Partnership
would extend its reach globally.260 Currently, the Global Partnershi is
composed of twenty-two member nations and the European Union.26
The Global Partnership does not distinguish between providing
nuclear security assistance to NWS and NNWS. Instead, the purpose of
this framework is to work with international partners across the globe to
respond and address nuclear proliferation challenges. 262 Again, this
lends support to the idea that regardless of nuclear weapon status, or
NPT-membership, state practice in this area permits international
nuclear weapon security cooperation to those states that lack sufficient
capacity. This analysis provides evidence that the trend for state-to-state
nuclear security cooperation is growing and that the international
community has seemingly accepted that such aid is an instrumental
aspect of nuclear nonproliferation and permissible under the NPT.
E. Relevant Rules ofInternationalLaw
Since the NPT's adoption in 1968, there have been tremendous
developments in the international legal framework of nuclear
nonproliferation that should be examined in conjunction with NPT
obligations and restrictions. The VCLT specifically states that as a
general rule of treaty interpretation, "[t]here shall be taken into account,
together with the context . . . any relevant rules of international law

applicable in the relations between the parties." 263 According to the
258. G8, supra note 255, at 2 (emphasis added).
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. P'ship for Global Sec., G-8 Summit Statement on Nonproliferation (July 8, 2008),
available at http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=laquila non
pro.pdf. See also P'ship for Global Sec., G-8 Global Partnership:Adapting New Realities (July
9, 2008), available at http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=
press release g8gp final.pdf [hereinafter Adapting New Realities].
261. Adapting New Realities, supra note 260. This membership includes: United States,
Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Poland,
Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, New
Zealand, South Korea, Ukraine, and the European Union. Id.
262. Id.
263. VCLT, supra note 123, art. 31(3)(c).
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International Law Commission (ILC), "[i]ntemational law is a legal
system. Its rules and principles (i.e., its norms) act in relation to and
should be interpreted against the background of other rules and
principles. As a legal system, international law is not a random
collection of such norms. There are meaningful relationships between
them." 264 Further, the ILC notes that "when several norms bear on a
single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to
give rise to a single set of compatible obligations." 26 Domestically,
courts have followed a similar principle: when at all possible, the courts
interpret congressional acts as not to conflict with international legal
regimes, which in turn helps avoid disharmony between two bodies of
law.26 More recent developments in nonproliferation international law
illustrate the different obligations the global community has undertaken
with regard to nuclear security. If these legal instruments and mandates
are to be construed in harmony with the NPT, they provide strong
evidence that nuclear security assistance is not precluded by Article I of
the NPT.
1. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
The CPPNM, which opened for signature in 1980 and entered into
force in 1987, establishes a range of measures related to the protection
of nuclear materials (primaril uranium and plutonium) while in
international nuclear transport.2 7 Pakistan acceded to the CPPNM in
2000268 and the United States ratified the Convention in 1982.269 The
264. International Law Commission, Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and
Expansion ofInternationalLaw, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (2006).
265. Id. This is known as the "Principle of Harmonization." Id. See also Advisory Opinion
on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia,
1971 I.C.J. 16, at 31 ("an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of its interpretation").
266. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains..."). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 114 (1987).

267. CPPNM, supra note 93. The CPPNM has 142 parties (subject to Entry into Force
date) and 45 signatories. Id.
268. Id. Pakistan acceded to the treaty with two reservations: (1) it is not "bound by
paragraph 2 of Article 2, as it regards the question of domestic use, storage and transport of
nuclear material beyond the scope of the said Convention," and (2) it is not bound by the dispute
settlement procedures stated in Article 17. Id.
269. Id. Upon signing the CPPNM's implementing legislation, President Reagan declared,
"[t]his step symbolizes our firm commitment both to preventing the spread ofnuclear explosives
and to fighting the scourge of terrorism." President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982,
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preamble paragraphs note that the CPPNM is intended to help "avert the
potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking and use of nuclear
material" and establishes "effective measures for the physical protection
of nuclear material." 27 0 More specifically, the CPPNM mandates that
"[i]n the case of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of nuclear
material or of credible threat thereof, States Parties shall, in accordance
with their national law, provide co-operation and assistance to the
maximum feasible extent in the recovery and protection of such
material to any State that so requests." 271 The CPPNM states that "as
appropriate, the States Parties concerned shall exchange information
with each other or international organizations with a view to protecting
threatened nuclear material, verifying the integrity of the shipping
container, or recovering unlawfully taken nuclear material and shall ...
render assistance; if requested."2 In addition, the CPPNM provides
that "States Parties shall co-operate and consult as appropriate, with
each other directly or through international organizations, with a view to
obtaining guidance on the design, maintenance and improvement of
systems of physical protection of nuclear material in international
transport.",273
In 2005, delegates from eighty-nine countries (including Pakistan
and the United States) convened in Vienna to broaden and strengthen
the CPPNM. 274 The Diplomatic Conference resulted in amendments to
the CPPNM that expand the scope of nuclear protections to cover
nuclear facilities and material in domestic use and storage.27 5 These
amendments also provide for expanded nuclear security cooperation
within the international community. 276 IAEA Director General
Mohamed ElBaradei commented on the Amendments affect on the
CPPNM: "[t]his new and stronger treaty is an important step towards
greater nuclear security by combating, preventing, and ultimately
available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edularchives/speeches/ 1982/101982a.htm (last visited
Jan. 24, 2011).
270. CPPNM, supranote 93, pmbl.
271. Id. art. 5(2) (emphasis added).
272. Id. art. 5(2)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). The CPPNM also states that State Parties shall (i)
co-ordinate their efforts through diplomatic and other agreed channels; (iii) ensure the return of
nuclear material stolen or missing as a consequence of the above-mentioned events. Id. (i) &
(iii).
273. Id. art. 5(3).
274. IAEA, International Conventions and Agreement: [CPPNMI: Background,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm.html
(last visited Jan. 24,
2011) [hereinafter CPPNM Background].
275. Id. See IAEA, Board of Governors, Nuclear Security-Measures to Protect Against
Nuclear Terrorism: Amendment to [CPPNM]: Report by the Director General,
GOV/INF/2005/10-GC(49)/INF/6 (Sept. 6, 2005) [hereinafter CPPNM Amendments].
276. CPPNM Background, supra note 274. See CPPNM Amendments, supra note 275.
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punishing those who would engage in nuclear theft, sabotage or even
terrorism. It demonstrates that there is indeed a global commitment to
remedy weaknesses in our nuclear security regime., 277 The amendments
will not enter into force until two-thirds of the parties approve of them,
and currently only thirty-four states have done so. 27 8
The CPPNM clearly believes international cooperation is a
significant component to nuclear security, and, the amendments to the
CPPNM expand the scope in which nuclear security assistance may be
rendered. The CPPNM does not distinguish between NWS and NNWS
or NPT State Party and non-NPT State Party. Rather, the CPPNM notes
that all signatories should be able to, inter alia, "exchange information"
and "render assistance" in the field of nuclear security.
2. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1540
The origins of United Nations [U.N.] Resolution 1540279 can be
traced to President George W. Bush's speech at the U.N. General
Assembly in September 2003.280 In the speech, President Bush called on
the U.N. Security Council to "adopt a new antiproliferation resolution"
that would mandate all U.N. Member States to "criminalize the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to enact strict export
controls consistent with international standards and to secure any and all
sensitive materials within their own borders." 28 1 "The United States,"
President Bush declared, "stands ready to hel any nation draft these
new laws and to assist in their enforcement."2 On April 28, 2004, the
U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1540, under the authority
granted by Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 283 "By taking the
extraordinary step of adopting the resolution under Chapter VII, the
U.N. Security Council highlighted the growing threat to international
security posed by [WMD] proliferation."2 84 The U.N. Security Council
277. IAEI: Press Release, States Agree on Stronger PhysicalProtection Regime (July 8,
2005).
278. CPPNM, supra note 93, art. 20; CPPNM Amendments, supra note 275.
279. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (April 28, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. 1540].
280. Masahiko Asada, Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism:
Effectiveness and Legitimacy in InternationalLegislation, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 303,
313-14 (2008).
281. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 23, 2003).
See generallyAsada, supra note 280, at 313-14.
282. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 23, 2003).
283. U.N. 1540, supra note 279. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter addresses "Action with
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." U.N.
CHARTER, ch. VII (1945) [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
284. NTI, [U.N.] Resolution 1540 (May 2009), available at http://www.nti.org/db/1540/
index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter NTI 1540].
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unanimously adopted Resolution 1540, which is binding on all U.N.
Member States 285 and "override[s] other international obligations." 2 86
Resolution 1540 explicitly states that the proliferation of nuclear
weapons "constitutes a threat to international peace and security." 287
Although the Resolution recognizes that "most States" have
implemented measures to "account for, secure and physically protect
sensitive materials," it also notes that there is an "urgent need for all
States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation
of nuclear chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery.
Resolution 1540 mandates that all States "shall take and
enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the
proliferation" of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. 289
In order to reach this end, States must:
(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to
account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or
transport;
(b) Develop and maintain
protection measures;

appropriate

effective physical

(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls
and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat,
including through international cooperation when necessary, the
illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with
their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with
international law;
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective
national export and trans-shipment controls over such items,
including appropriate laws and regulations to control export,
transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing
funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such
as financing, and transporting that would contribute to
proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and
285. Id. The U.N. Charter notes, "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." U.N.
Charter, supra note 283, art. 25. See generally Dep't of State, Under Secretary for Arms Control
and International Security, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, UN Security
Council Resolution 1540, availableat http://www.state.gov/t/isn/cl8943.htm.
286. NTI 1540, supra note 284.
287. U.N. 1540, supra note 279, pmbl.
288. Id.
289. Id.13.
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establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties
for violations of such export control laws and regulations ... .290
The Resolution specifically notes that "none of the obligations set
forth .. . shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and
obligations of State Parties to the [NPT]. . . .""' This is significant

because paragraph seven of the Resolution addresses the fact that "some
States may require assistance in implementing" the nuclear weapon
security measures and "invites States in a position to do so to offer
assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States
lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation
experience and/or resources for fulfilling [these] provisions." 292
Therefore, by its very terms, U.N. Resolution 1540 dictates that certain
forms of nuclear weapon security assistance can be provided without
conflicting with the NPT's "Transfer" and "Assistance" Provisions.
Similar to global nuclear security institutions, Security Council
Resolution 1540 does not distinguish between NWS and NNWS in the
context of who may offer and who may receive assistance. Rather, it
merely notes that States "in a position to do so" should provide nuclear
assistance when such aid is requested. Therefore, under Resolution
1540, if Pakistan requested nuclear weapon security assistance, the
United States could "offer assistance" without being in "conflict" with
its "obligation . . . to the NPT." The international community has

demonstrated, through U.N. Resolution 1540, that nuclear weapon
security assistance is a fundamental aspect of global security and
providing said assistance would not infringe on NPT obligations.
F. Executive Branch Interpretation
Although the VCLT does not mention this method of construction,
domestic courts have routinely looked to the Executive Branch for
guidance during treaty interpretation. The president is the "sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations" 29 and,
given his responsibility for overseeing the actual implementation of
treaties with other nations, the president has the authority to interpret
these agreements for the purpose of U.S. foreign relations. 294 The
Supreme Court has noted that "[a]lthough not conclusive, the meaning

290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id. 5.
Id. 7.
United States v. Curtiss Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).

294.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

326 cmt.

a (1987).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

45

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

46

[Vol. 23

attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with
their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight." 2 9
Although the Executive Branch has not formally disclosed its
opinion on what actions could constitute an Article I violation, some
statements and policies articulated by both current and former
presidential administrations lend support to the argument that the NPT
does not preclude the United States from providing nuclear security
assistance to Pakistan. For instance, in April 2009, President Obama
remarked on assisting Pakistan with its nuclear weapons security: "I'm
confident that [the United States] can make sure that Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal is secure .

. .

. We've got strong military-to-military consultation

296

The president continued, "we will provide
and cooperation."
[Pakistan] all the cooperation that we can. We want to respect their
sovereignty, but we also recognize that we have huge strategic interests,
huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable
and that you don't end up having a nuclear-armed militant state."2 9 7
More recently, at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, President
Obama stated his intention to work with the international community to
secure nuclear weapons and materials around the world regardless of a
country's nuclear weapon-or NPT membership-status. 98 Additionally,
when then-Senator Clinton was partaking in a presidential primary
debate in 2007, she stated that, if elected president, she would work
with the Pakistani government "to share the security responsibility of
the nuclear weapons with a delegation from the United States and
perhaps Great Britain so that there is some failsafe." 299 It is unclear
whether Secretary of State Clinton has attempted to implement this
policy at the State Department. Additionally, it was reported that the
Bush Administration spent almost $100 million on a program designed
to aid Pakistan in securing its nuclear arsenal. 30 0 The money was spent
on, inter alia, nuclear security training for Pakistani personnel,
construction of a nuclear security training center in Pakistan, and
nuclear detection equipment.3 0

295. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) (citing to
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)).
296. President Obama's 100th-Day Press Briefing (Apr. 29, 2009), transcript available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30488052/ ns/politics-whitehouse.
297. Id.
298. Nuclear Sec. Summit Nat'l Statement of the United States (White House Office of the
Press Secretary, Apr. 3, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
nuclear-security-summit-national-statement-united-states (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
299. Jon Fox, Clinton Proposes U.S. Role in PakistaniNuclearSecurity, GLOBAL SECURITY
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 7, 2008.
300. See Sanger & Broad, supra note 11.
301. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Given Pakistan's perceived regional security concerns, it is
improbable that it will dismantle its nuclear weapons program in the
near future. By providing Pakistan with nuclear weapon security
assistance, the United States will greatly decrease the opportunity for
both nuclear proliferation and a domestic nuclear terrorist attack. By
utilizing a broad range of treaty construction mechanisms and by
examining the entire international context in which the NPT was written
and is implemented, one is able to deduce that such assistance is
compatible with the U.S. international obligations. A thorough
examination of the NPT reveals several important conclusions on this
point.
First, by providing nuclear security assistance to an existing nuclear
arsenal, the United States will be acting in concert with the NPT's stated
nuclear nonproliferation goals and objectives. Second, the framers of
NPT Article I were primarily concerned with prohibiting the actual
sharing of nuclear weapons within military alliances and did not openly
condemn international cooperation with regard to nuclear weapon
security. Third, at the time of ratification, the United States believed
that the NPT reflected domestic law in that it essentially prohibited the
transfer of nuclear weapons.
Neither the Senate nor the president expressed reservation that the
NPT would prohibit international nuclear security cooperation and it
was understood that Article I "deals only with what is prohibited, not
with what is permitted." 302 Fourth, state practice has evolved to the
extent that there is a recognizable international acceptance of countryto-country nuclear weapon security cooperation. Initial NWS-to-NWS
cooperation in this area has greatly expanded in the last twenty years to
include global NWS-to-NNWS nuclear security assistance programs
and expanding such aid to Pakistan would thus be consistent with state
practice. Fifth, since the NPT entered into force, more novel
international legal regimes have codified the necessity of international
nuclear weapon security cooperation; if these bodies of law are to be
interpreted in conjuncture and harmony with the NPT, they provide
strong evidence that U.S.-Pakistani nuclear weapon security assistance
does not violate NPT restrictions. Sixth, the Executive Branch, which is
responsible for overseeing the implementation of all treaties, has openly
declared that the United States should work unilaterally and
multilaterally to ensure that all states (including Pakistan) have secure
nuclear weapons.

302.

NEGOTIATIONS,

supranote 177, at 180.
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